Globalization, Roving Bandits, and Marine Resources
POLICYFORUM
ECOLOGY
Marine resource exploitation can deplete stocks
Globalization, Roving Bandits, faster than regulatory agencies can respond.
Institutions with broad authority and a global
and Marine Resources perspective are needed to create a system with
incentives for conservation.
F. Berkes,1* T. P. Hughes,2 R. S. Steneck,3 J. A. Wilson,4 D. R. Bellwood,2 B. Crona,5,6 C. Folke,5,6
L. H. Gunderson,7 H. M. Leslie,8 J. Norberg,6 M. Nyström,5,6 P. Olsson,5 H. Österblom,6
M. Scheffer,9 B. Worm10
verfishing is increasingly
O threatening the world’s ma-
rine ecosystems (1, 2). The
search for the social causes of this
1992 1980
crisis has often focused on inappro- 1982
1971
priate approaches to governance and 1989
lack of incentives for conservation 1995 1987
1960 1973
(3, 4). Little attention, however, has 1967 1945
1960
been paid to the critical impact of
1972
sequential exploitation: the spatially 1970
expanding depletion of harvested
species (5). The economist Mancur
Olson (6) argued that local gover-
nance creates a vested interest in the
1975
1983
maintenance of local resources, 1986
whereas the ability of mobile
agents—roving bandits in Olson’s
terminology—to move on to other,
unprotected resources severs local Sequential exploitation of a marine resource. Initiation year by location of major commercial fishery for sea urchins.
feedback and the incentive to build
conserving institutions. Distant water fleets and develop so rapidly that the speed of resource There is a rich history of roving bandits tar-
mobile traders can operate like roving bandits (7), exploitation often overwhelms the ability of geting ecologically important large predators
because global markets often fail to generate the local institutions to respond. such as the cod that historically dominated North
self-interest that arises from attachment to place. Until recently, exploitation of marine resources Atlantic coastal ecosystems. By the middle of
The effect of roving bandits can be explained was commonly constrained by the inaccessibil- the last century, fishing technology had devel-
by “tragedy of the commons,” whereby a freely ity of remote and offshore locations. Conse- oped to the point where cod spawning aggrega-
accessible (or open-access) resource is competi- quently, early examples of global markets in tions in the Gulf of Maine could be removed
tively depleted. Harvesters have no incentive to fisheries (e.g., Newfoundland Grand Banks in wholesale. Within two decades, local stocks had
conserve; whatever they do not take will be har- the 1500s) were characterized by slow growth been depleted, contributing to the rise of inverte-
vested by others. Developing the institutions to and relatively inefficient harvest technology. brate species such as lobsters, crabs, and sea
deal with commons issues is problematic and They were typically based on species that were urchins that had formerly been prey to cod and
slow (8). Roving banditry is different from most plentiful, readily caught, and easily transported other apex predators (10).
commons dilemmas in that a new dynamic has without refrigeration (e.g., dried, salted, or ren- Highly altered ecosystems can often stimu-
arisen in the globalized world: New markets can dered for oil). Many of these constraints have late new fisheries, which typically target lower
evaporated with globalization. The trade-induced trophic levels (1). In Maine, the green sea urchin
increases in demand for fisheries resources (Strongylocentrotus droebachiensis) prolifer-
1Natural Resources Institute, University of Manitoba,
Winnipeg, Manitoba R3T 2N2, Canada. 2Australian have resulted in an increasingly serious ecolog- ated after the loss of its fish predators in the mid-
Research Council Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef ical and management problem. 1980s (9), itself in turn becoming a fishery for
Studies, School of Marine Biology, James Cook University,
sushi markets. Spurred by demand from the
3School of Marine
Townsville, QLD 4811, Australia.
Ecological Implications Japanese market, an unregulated harvest began
Sciences, University of Maine, Walpole, ME 04573, USA.
4 School of Marine Sciences, University of Maine,
Sequential depletions of species that are major in 1987. The state of Maine was unprepared to
5Centre for Transdisciplinary
Orono, ME 04469, USA. conduits for the flow of energy and materials in deal with the explosive growth of the fishery, and
Environmental Research, 6Department of Systems Ecology,
marine food webs pose the greatest ecological stocks were rapidly depleted.
Stockholm University, 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden.
risks. For example, historic exploitation of sea To put the Maine sea urchin fishery in histor-
7Department of Environmental Studies, Emory University,
Atlanta, GA 30322, USA. 8Department of Ecology and otters for their pelts in Alaska’s remote Aleutian ical context, we show the spatial expansion of
Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Islands had profound ecological consequences, harvests (see figure, this page) and the sequen-
08544, USA. 9Aquatic Ecology and Water Quality
because this keystone predator controls the tial depletion of stocks (see graph, page 1558) by
Management Group, Department of Environmental
abundance of sea urchins that graze on kelp. waves of exploitation around the globe.
Sciences, Wageningen University, 6700 DD Wageningen,
Depletion of sea otters caused massive defor- Commercial sea urchin harvest began largely for
The Netherlands. 10Biology Department, Dalhousie
University, Halifax, Nova Scotia B3H 4J1, Canada. estation of kelp beds by plagues of sea urchins export to Japanese markets, after Japan’s own
for over a century, before active reintroductions resources declined. The Chilean fishery, for
*Author for correspondence. E-mail: berkes@cc.
of sea otters reversed this trend (9). example, supplied relatively small domestic
umanitoba.ca
1557
www.sciencemag.org SCIENCE VOL 311 17 MARCH 2006
Published by AAAS
POLICYFORUM
markets until 1975, when it rapidly expanded into Marine Park, the largest MPA in the world (33% and benefits to create incentives for local protec-
an export fishery (11). Spatial expansion of which is zoned as NTA) is too small to main- tion and monitoring. Property rights approaches
masked regional depletions, a common charac- tain stocks of marine mammals, turtles, and have proved to be particularly effective with
teristic of sequential exploitation (2, 5). Global sharks that migrate across its boundaries. In stationary resources such as sea urchins and
harvest peaked in about 1990 with the expansion any case, areas outside NTAs and MPAs also abalone (3, 4). For migratory marine resources,
of the fishery to new regions, but declined after need protection. however, the challenge is to establish governance
that because there were no frontiers left to exploit. At the international scale, CITES (U.N. mechanisms that operate at national and interna-
The resulting simplification of food webs Convention on International Trade in En- tional scales (18, 19). If major markets and tar-
and loss of biodiversity are eroding the resil- dangered Species) bans or controls trade only in geted species are known, the next exploitation
ience of marine ecosystems and increasing their species placed on appendix I or II of CITES, wave may be foreseeable from analyses such as
vulnerability to environmental change (12, 13). respectively. The meetings to vote on proposals the one here and from patterns of depletion and
For example, fishing pressure on many coral to place species in the appendices take place recovery of key species groups (20).
every 2 years, a blunt and inef- Crucially important here are multilevel
fective instrument indeed to pro- governance institutions operating at diverse
14
tect stocks that may be scooped levels, from local to international (21). No sin-
up within months. Even identi- gle approach can solve problems emerging
12
fying species at risk is a gigantic from globalization and sequential exploitation.
Global harvest (104 t)
10
task. Other than CITES, there But the various approaches used together can
are no restraints on trade or even slow down the roving bandit effects, and can
8
effective reporting mechanisms. replace destructive incentives with a resource
6 Addressing the ecological rights framework that mobilizes environmental
impacts of globalization means stewardship, i.e., one that builds the self-
4
finding ways to match the growth interested, conserving feedback that comes
2 in demand for local marine prod- from attachment to place.
ucts, with the development of
0
institutions to regulate harvest- References and Notes
1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995
1. J. B. C. Jackson et al., Science 293, 629 (2001).
ing (15). Appropriate restraining
Year 2. R. A. Myers, B. Worm, Nature 423, 280 (2003).
institutions must be in place 3. R. Hilborn, J. M. Orensanz, A. M. Parma, Philos. Trans. R.
Global sea urchin harvests over time. Color coded by region, in before the resource is at risk. Soc. London Ser. B 360, 47 (2005).
chronological ascending order: Japan; Korea; Washington and Solutions depend ultimately on 4. J. C. Castilla, O. Defeo, Science 309, 1324 (2005).
5. M. Huitric, Ecol. Soc. 10(1), 21 (2005);
Oregon; Baja, Mexico; California; Chile; NE Pacific (Alaska and British changed behavior at the local
(www.ecologyandsociety.org).
Columbia); Russia; NW Atlantic (Maine, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick). level, but the problem must be 6. M. Olson, Power and Prosperity (Basic Books, New York,
All data are from (11). addressed at multiple scales. 2000).
Global, regional, and national 7. Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), Fish Piracy: Combating Illegal,
reefs has increased dramatically with the emer- bodies need to monitor trade and resource trends
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (OECD Publications,
gence of export markets for restaurant and and find ways to disseminate information that Paris, 2004).
aquarium trades, highly mobile boom-and-bust stimulates problem-solving consistent with local 8. T. Dietz, E. Ostrom, P. C. Stern, Science 302, 1907
fisheries based on rapid air transport to growing practices. They need to enable local authorities to (2003).
9. R. S. Steneck et al., Environ. Conserv. 29, 436 (2002).
luxury markets. Depletion of herbivorous fishes learn from the experience of others around the
10. R. S. Steneck, E. Sala, in Large Carnivores and the
has contributed to algal blooms on reefs, world. Most important, they have to encourage Conservation of Biodiversity, J. Ray, K. Redford, R.
because algae released from their consumers local governance and assist in the development of Steneck, and J. Berger, Eds. (Island Press, Washington,
out-compete corals for space. Consequently, resource rights that align individual self-interest DC, 2005), pp. 110–137.
11. N. L. Andrew et al., Oceanogr. Mar. Biol. Annu. Rev. 40,
overfished reefs are less resilient to recurrent with the long-term health of the resource.
343 (2002).
disturbances, such as hurricanes, and more vul- Checks can be established through harvest- 12. T. P. Hughes et al., Trends. Ecol. Evol. 20, 380 (2005).
nerable to coral bleaching and mortality caused ing permits, certification, and controls over 13. D. R. Bellwood, T. P. Hughes, C. Folke, M. Nystrom,
by global warming (14). delivery of products to markets to dampen the Nature 429, 827 (2004).
14. T. P. Hughes et al., Science 301, 929 (2003).
rate of increase in demand. Technological
15. O. Young, The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental
Management Implications changes make detection in global transport of a Change (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002).
There have been few effective responses to this product possible. Monitoring of foreign direct 16. R. Costanza et al., Ecol. Econ. 31, 171 (1999).
kind of exploitation, because the emergence of investments (7), increased transparency of vessel 17. D. C. Wilson, J. Raakjaer Nielsen, P. Degnbol, Eds., The
Fisheries Co-Management Experience (Kluwer, Dordrecht,
specialized export markets for hitherto unex- flag history, and identification of vessel owners
Netherlands, 2003).
ploited stocks is almost always a surprise to and roving buyers will improve the ability to 18. F. Berkes, in Indigenous Use and Management of Marine
managers. In the case of small or highly local- track potential problems. Costs of regulation Resources, N. Kishigami, J. M. Savelle, Eds. (National
ized stocks, the resource may vanish even must be balanced against the costs of potential Museum of Ethnology, Osaka, 2005), pp. 13–31.
19. J. Wilson, Ecol. Soc. 11(1), 9 (2006); (www.ecologyand
before the problem is noted. In the case of more losses due to inaction (16). For example, Maine’s
society.org).
widely distributed, relatively abundant species, precautionary fisheries laws (adopted in 20. R. A. Myers, B. Worm, Philos. Trans. R. Soc. London Ser. B
serial depletions of local stocks may be masked response to the urchin debacle) recognize the 360, 13 (2005).
by spatial shifts in exploitation (see figure, need to deliberately seek to slow down the devel- 21. C. Folke et al. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 30, 441
(2005).
p. 1557, and graph, this page). opment of new marine products.
22. We thank James Cook University and the Beijer Inter-
Existing marine protected areas (MPAs) and Common property theory predicts that the national Institute for Ecological Economics for co-hosting
no-take areas (NTAs) are often too small and too establishment of property rights (8) and/or co- workshops on Resilience of Marine Ecosystems in Sweden
far apart to sustain processes within the broader management regimes (17) counters the tragedy and Australia that led to this article.
seascape, and monitoring and enforcement are of the commons. Individual or community prop-
often inadequate. Even the Great Barrier Reef erty rights over resources can internalize costs 10.1126/science.1122804
1558 17 MARCH 2006 VOL 311 SCIENCE www.sciencemag.org
Published by AAAS
ECOLOGY
Marine resource exploitation can deplete stocks
Globalization, Roving Bandits, faster than regulatory agencies can respond.
Institutions with broad authority and a global
and Marine Resources perspective are needed to create a system with
incentives for conservation.
F. Berkes,1* T. P. Hughes,2 R. S. Steneck,3 J. A. Wilson,4 D. R. Bellwood,2 B. Crona,5,6 C. Folke,5,6
L. H. Gunderson,7 H. M. Leslie,8 J. Norberg,6 M. Nyström,5,6 P. Olsson,5 H. Österblom,6
M. Scheffer,9 B. Worm10
verfishing is increasingly
O threatening the world’s ma-
rine ecosystems (1, 2). The
search for the social causes of this
1992 1980
crisis has often focused on inappro- 1982
1971
priate approaches to governance and 1989
lack of incentives for conservation 1995 1987
1960 1973
(3, 4). Little attention, however, has 1967 1945
1960
been paid to the critical impact of
1972
sequential exploitation: the spatially 1970
expanding depletion of harvested
species (5). The economist Mancur
Olson (6) argued that local gover-
nance creates a vested interest in the
1975
1983
maintenance of local resources, 1986
whereas the ability of mobile
agents—roving bandits in Olson’s
terminology—to move on to other,
unprotected resources severs local Sequential exploitation of a marine resource. Initiation year by location of major commercial fishery for sea urchins.
feedback and the incentive to build
conserving institutions. Distant water fleets and develop so rapidly that the speed of resource There is a rich history of roving bandits tar-
mobile traders can operate like roving bandits (7), exploitation often overwhelms the ability of geting ecologically important large predators
because global markets often fail to generate the local institutions to respond. such as the cod that historically dominated North
self-interest that arises from attachment to place. Until recently, exploitation of marine resources Atlantic coastal ecosystems. By the middle of
The effect of roving bandits can be explained was commonly constrained by the inaccessibil- the last century, fishing technology had devel-
by “tragedy of the commons,” whereby a freely ity of remote and offshore locations. Conse- oped to the point where cod spawning aggrega-
accessible (or open-access) resource is competi- quently, early examples of global markets in tions in the Gulf of Maine could be removed
tively depleted. Harvesters have no incentive to fisheries (e.g., Newfoundland Grand Banks in wholesale. Within two decades, local stocks had
conserve; whatever they do not take will be har- the 1500s) were characterized by slow growth been depleted, contributing to the rise of inverte-
vested by others. Developing the institutions to and relatively inefficient harvest technology. brate species such as lobsters, crabs, and sea
deal with commons issues is problematic and They were typically based on species that were urchins that had formerly been prey to cod and
slow (8). Roving banditry is different from most plentiful, readily caught, and easily transported other apex predators (10).
commons dilemmas in that a new dynamic has without refrigeration (e.g., dried, salted, or ren- Highly altered ecosystems can often stimu-
arisen in the globalized world: New markets can dered for oil). Many of these constraints have late new fisheries, which typically target lower
evaporated with globalization. The trade-induced trophic levels (1). In Maine, the green sea urchin
increases in demand for fisheries resources (Strongylocentrotus droebachiensis) prolifer-
1Natural Resources Institute, University of Manitoba,
Winnipeg, Manitoba R3T 2N2, Canada. 2Australian have resulted in an increasingly serious ecolog- ated after the loss of its fish predators in the mid-
Research Council Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef ical and management problem. 1980s (9), itself in turn becoming a fishery for
Studies, School of Marine Biology, James Cook University,
sushi markets. Spurred by demand from the
3School of Marine
Townsville, QLD 4811, Australia.
Ecological Implications Japanese market, an unregulated harvest began
Sciences, University of Maine, Walpole, ME 04573, USA.
4 School of Marine Sciences, University of Maine,
Sequential depletions of species that are major in 1987. The state of Maine was unprepared to
5Centre for Transdisciplinary
Orono, ME 04469, USA. conduits for the flow of energy and materials in deal with the explosive growth of the fishery, and
Environmental Research, 6Department of Systems Ecology,
marine food webs pose the greatest ecological stocks were rapidly depleted.
Stockholm University, 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden.
risks. For example, historic exploitation of sea To put the Maine sea urchin fishery in histor-
7Department of Environmental Studies, Emory University,
Atlanta, GA 30322, USA. 8Department of Ecology and otters for their pelts in Alaska’s remote Aleutian ical context, we show the spatial expansion of
Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Islands had profound ecological consequences, harvests (see figure, this page) and the sequen-
08544, USA. 9Aquatic Ecology and Water Quality
because this keystone predator controls the tial depletion of stocks (see graph, page 1558) by
Management Group, Department of Environmental
abundance of sea urchins that graze on kelp. waves of exploitation around the globe.
Sciences, Wageningen University, 6700 DD Wageningen,
Depletion of sea otters caused massive defor- Commercial sea urchin harvest began largely for
The Netherlands. 10Biology Department, Dalhousie
University, Halifax, Nova Scotia B3H 4J1, Canada. estation of kelp beds by plagues of sea urchins export to Japanese markets, after Japan’s own
for over a century, before active reintroductions resources declined. The Chilean fishery, for
*Author for correspondence. E-mail: berkes@cc.
of sea otters reversed this trend (9). example, supplied relatively small domestic
umanitoba.ca
1557
www.sciencemag.org SCIENCE VOL 311 17 MARCH 2006
Published by AAAS
POLICYFORUM
markets until 1975, when it rapidly expanded into Marine Park, the largest MPA in the world (33% and benefits to create incentives for local protec-
an export fishery (11). Spatial expansion of which is zoned as NTA) is too small to main- tion and monitoring. Property rights approaches
masked regional depletions, a common charac- tain stocks of marine mammals, turtles, and have proved to be particularly effective with
teristic of sequential exploitation (2, 5). Global sharks that migrate across its boundaries. In stationary resources such as sea urchins and
harvest peaked in about 1990 with the expansion any case, areas outside NTAs and MPAs also abalone (3, 4). For migratory marine resources,
of the fishery to new regions, but declined after need protection. however, the challenge is to establish governance
that because there were no frontiers left to exploit. At the international scale, CITES (U.N. mechanisms that operate at national and interna-
The resulting simplification of food webs Convention on International Trade in En- tional scales (18, 19). If major markets and tar-
and loss of biodiversity are eroding the resil- dangered Species) bans or controls trade only in geted species are known, the next exploitation
ience of marine ecosystems and increasing their species placed on appendix I or II of CITES, wave may be foreseeable from analyses such as
vulnerability to environmental change (12, 13). respectively. The meetings to vote on proposals the one here and from patterns of depletion and
For example, fishing pressure on many coral to place species in the appendices take place recovery of key species groups (20).
every 2 years, a blunt and inef- Crucially important here are multilevel
fective instrument indeed to pro- governance institutions operating at diverse
14
tect stocks that may be scooped levels, from local to international (21). No sin-
up within months. Even identi- gle approach can solve problems emerging
12
fying species at risk is a gigantic from globalization and sequential exploitation.
Global harvest (104 t)
10
task. Other than CITES, there But the various approaches used together can
are no restraints on trade or even slow down the roving bandit effects, and can
8
effective reporting mechanisms. replace destructive incentives with a resource
6 Addressing the ecological rights framework that mobilizes environmental
impacts of globalization means stewardship, i.e., one that builds the self-
4
finding ways to match the growth interested, conserving feedback that comes
2 in demand for local marine prod- from attachment to place.
ucts, with the development of
0
institutions to regulate harvest- References and Notes
1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995
1. J. B. C. Jackson et al., Science 293, 629 (2001).
ing (15). Appropriate restraining
Year 2. R. A. Myers, B. Worm, Nature 423, 280 (2003).
institutions must be in place 3. R. Hilborn, J. M. Orensanz, A. M. Parma, Philos. Trans. R.
Global sea urchin harvests over time. Color coded by region, in before the resource is at risk. Soc. London Ser. B 360, 47 (2005).
chronological ascending order: Japan; Korea; Washington and Solutions depend ultimately on 4. J. C. Castilla, O. Defeo, Science 309, 1324 (2005).
5. M. Huitric, Ecol. Soc. 10(1), 21 (2005);
Oregon; Baja, Mexico; California; Chile; NE Pacific (Alaska and British changed behavior at the local
(www.ecologyandsociety.org).
Columbia); Russia; NW Atlantic (Maine, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick). level, but the problem must be 6. M. Olson, Power and Prosperity (Basic Books, New York,
All data are from (11). addressed at multiple scales. 2000).
Global, regional, and national 7. Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), Fish Piracy: Combating Illegal,
reefs has increased dramatically with the emer- bodies need to monitor trade and resource trends
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (OECD Publications,
gence of export markets for restaurant and and find ways to disseminate information that Paris, 2004).
aquarium trades, highly mobile boom-and-bust stimulates problem-solving consistent with local 8. T. Dietz, E. Ostrom, P. C. Stern, Science 302, 1907
fisheries based on rapid air transport to growing practices. They need to enable local authorities to (2003).
9. R. S. Steneck et al., Environ. Conserv. 29, 436 (2002).
luxury markets. Depletion of herbivorous fishes learn from the experience of others around the
10. R. S. Steneck, E. Sala, in Large Carnivores and the
has contributed to algal blooms on reefs, world. Most important, they have to encourage Conservation of Biodiversity, J. Ray, K. Redford, R.
because algae released from their consumers local governance and assist in the development of Steneck, and J. Berger, Eds. (Island Press, Washington,
out-compete corals for space. Consequently, resource rights that align individual self-interest DC, 2005), pp. 110–137.
11. N. L. Andrew et al., Oceanogr. Mar. Biol. Annu. Rev. 40,
overfished reefs are less resilient to recurrent with the long-term health of the resource.
343 (2002).
disturbances, such as hurricanes, and more vul- Checks can be established through harvest- 12. T. P. Hughes et al., Trends. Ecol. Evol. 20, 380 (2005).
nerable to coral bleaching and mortality caused ing permits, certification, and controls over 13. D. R. Bellwood, T. P. Hughes, C. Folke, M. Nystrom,
by global warming (14). delivery of products to markets to dampen the Nature 429, 827 (2004).
14. T. P. Hughes et al., Science 301, 929 (2003).
rate of increase in demand. Technological
15. O. Young, The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental
Management Implications changes make detection in global transport of a Change (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002).
There have been few effective responses to this product possible. Monitoring of foreign direct 16. R. Costanza et al., Ecol. Econ. 31, 171 (1999).
kind of exploitation, because the emergence of investments (7), increased transparency of vessel 17. D. C. Wilson, J. Raakjaer Nielsen, P. Degnbol, Eds., The
Fisheries Co-Management Experience (Kluwer, Dordrecht,
specialized export markets for hitherto unex- flag history, and identification of vessel owners
Netherlands, 2003).
ploited stocks is almost always a surprise to and roving buyers will improve the ability to 18. F. Berkes, in Indigenous Use and Management of Marine
managers. In the case of small or highly local- track potential problems. Costs of regulation Resources, N. Kishigami, J. M. Savelle, Eds. (National
ized stocks, the resource may vanish even must be balanced against the costs of potential Museum of Ethnology, Osaka, 2005), pp. 13–31.
19. J. Wilson, Ecol. Soc. 11(1), 9 (2006); (www.ecologyand
before the problem is noted. In the case of more losses due to inaction (16). For example, Maine’s
society.org).
widely distributed, relatively abundant species, precautionary fisheries laws (adopted in 20. R. A. Myers, B. Worm, Philos. Trans. R. Soc. London Ser. B
serial depletions of local stocks may be masked response to the urchin debacle) recognize the 360, 13 (2005).
by spatial shifts in exploitation (see figure, need to deliberately seek to slow down the devel- 21. C. Folke et al. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 30, 441
(2005).
p. 1557, and graph, this page). opment of new marine products.
22. We thank James Cook University and the Beijer Inter-
Existing marine protected areas (MPAs) and Common property theory predicts that the national Institute for Ecological Economics for co-hosting
no-take areas (NTAs) are often too small and too establishment of property rights (8) and/or co- workshops on Resilience of Marine Ecosystems in Sweden
far apart to sustain processes within the broader management regimes (17) counters the tragedy and Australia that led to this article.
seascape, and monitoring and enforcement are of the commons. Individual or community prop-
often inadequate. Even the Great Barrier Reef erty rights over resources can internalize costs 10.1126/science.1122804
1558 17 MARCH 2006 VOL 311 SCIENCE www.sciencemag.org
Published by AAAS