Special Roundtable Section


Practicing Interdisciplinarity

SHARACHCHANDRA LÉLÉ AND RICHARD B. NORGAARD




We explore the practical difficulties of interdisciplinary research in the context of a regional- or local-scale project. We posit four barriers to
interdisciplinarity that are common across many disciplines and draw on our own experience and on other sources to explore how these barriers are
manifested. Values enter into scientific theories and data collection through scientists’ hidden assumptions about disciplines other than their own, through
the differences between quantitative and interpretive social sciences, and through roadblocks created by the organization of academia and the
relationship between academics and the larger society. Participants in interdisciplinary projects need to be self-reflective about the value
judgments embedded in their choice of variables and models. They should identify and use a core set of shared concerns to motivate the effort, be
willing to respect and to learn more about the “other,” be able to work with new models and alternative taxonomies, and allow for plurality and
incompleteness.

Keywords: epistemology, sociology of science, interdisciplinary research, environmental problems




T                                         energizes them to understand these differences. Many, how-
   hinking collectively about complex problems
   requires crossing boundaries both horizontally (across            ever, decide that it takes too much effort to communicate and
disciplines) and vertically (across experts, policymakers, prac-          share knowledge within such a disparate group, and happily
titioners, and the public) (Klein 2004). Although the debates           retreat to their own special fields, where all the participants
on climate change discussed elsewhere in this issue (Norgaard           use the same models of analysis, are comfortable with the as-
and Baer 2005a) exemplify strong boundary crossing in both             sumptions they share as a group, and consequently “know”
dimensions, most scholars, when they venture into collective            the same things. The purpose of this article is to help re-
thinking, may begin with collaborations that stress the more            searchers who do choose to engage in interdisciplinary work
academic, horizontal crossings. Much of the current inter-             by identifying the barriers to interdisciplinarity in a way that
disciplinary research on the environment is probably of this            makes them easier to overcome. At the outset, we would like
kind, and it also tends to have a smaller geographical focus            to point out that the term “discipline” is a little too slippery
than ongoing debates on climate change. Without gainsaying             for a thorough analysis of the types of barriers that need to
the need for crossings in the vertical dimension, an analysis           be surmounted (box 1). But given that most of us are brought
of interdisciplinarity in this limited context can provide use-          up with these disciplinary labels, we will continue to use the
ful insights into the problems generated by researchers’ dis-           major disciplinary categories or blocks (the “natural” and the
ciplinary training and conditioning. In the context of working           “social” sciences) as a starting point, identifying the incon-
with a team of scholars from several disciplines on a regional-          sistencies and subtleties as we go along. We should also men-
scale project, we explore the practical difficulties of partici-          tion that, for the sake of brevity, we use the term
pating in interdisciplinary research, drawing on our own              “interdisciplinarity” loosely to describe all types of crossings
experience in the fields of forestry, biodiversity, and hydrol-          between or among disciplines, glossing over the subtle dif-
ogy, as well as other sources.                           ferences between multi-, inter-, and transdisciplinarity that
  When scientists come together in such teams, it is usually           are highlighted in more elaborate discussions on this subject
around some shared interest, such as conserving biological di-           (see, e.g., Kockelmans 1979).
versity or improving the food security of the poor. These
shared interests, however, do not translate into a research
plan with predetermined bridges between the disciplines.              Sharachchandra Lélé (e-mail: slele@isec.ac.in) works at the Centre for
Problems may show up early. When engaging with their col-             Interdisciplinary Studies in Environment and Development, Bangalore, India.
leagues in other fields, scientists typically find that their col-         Richard B. Norgaard (e-mail: norgaard@igc.org) works in the Energy and
leagues define the problem quite differently or seek different           Resources Group, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720. © 2005
types of answers. For a few, this is an exciting discovery that          American Institute of Biological Sciences.


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Special Roundtable Section

  We begin by outlining a common set of barriers that schol-     truth” (p. 106). These differences may exist even between
ars from different disciplines are likely to encounter when they   disciplines within each disciplinary block. Certainly a major
come together to work on a project. Next, we discuss which      difference between the approaches of anthropologists and
barriers are most important and what shape they take when       economists is their differing perception about the objective
working within the natural sciences. Third, we address the      versus subjective nature of scientific knowledge and whether
more difficult problems of working across the natural and so-     it is context specific or general. Within the natural sciences,
cial sciences. One of the reasons it is so difficult for natural   although belief in the “knowability” of the world generally
scientists to work with social scientists is because the latter    reigns supreme, scientists studying complex processes such as
themselves are divided, as we explain in more detail below.      those in ecology have grappled with the question of how
                                   much we can know through reductionist models and exper-
Barriers to interdisciplinarity                    imentation (see, e.g., Botkin 1990).
We identified four major types of barrier to interdisciplinar-      Finally, the way in which society interacts with and orga-
ity. First, there is the problem of values being embedded in all   nizes academia influences the production of interdiscipli-
types of inquiry and at all stages: in the choice of questions,    nary research. As Schoenberger (2001) and others have
theoretical positions, variables, and style of research. But cer-   pointed out, the relative importance or validity of a direction
tainly natural scientists, and even social ones, are loath to ac-   of inquiry or approach is not determined simply by some ob-
knowledge the presence of value judgments in their work.       jective recognition by academics of its ability to generate
Furthermore, in the context of contentious social issues (e.g.,    more valid knowledge than another approach. Forces at work
sustainable development), decisionmakers call on scientists      in a larger society outside academia shape the perception of
to provide “objective” advice, making such acknowledgment       importance gained by a certain discipline, or by a particular
even more difficult. Consequently, the collective judgment re-    kind of interdisciplinary crossing. This generates differences
quired in interdisciplinary research is especially difficult. It is  in the attention paid to (and resources commanded by) dif-
fraught with the possibility that scientists will “talk past each   ferent disciplines, and consequently conditions behavioral pat-
other” because of the ways in which the disciplines assert eth-    terns, such as arrogance or defensiveness, among their
ical neutrality and cast a blind eye to their own normative      practitioners. Society also influences the institutional arrange-
positions.                              ments within academia that create incentives or disincentives
  Second, researchers in different disciplines may study the     for interdisciplinary knowledge production.
same phenomenon but differ in their theories or explanatory        Below, we elaborate on these barriers to collective inter-
models (and underlying assumptions). In the case of complex      disciplinarity, and discuss more specific examples. We begin
phenomena, it is not easy to prove the superiority of one the-    with a brief discussion of the smallest divides or barriers—
ory over another in a particular case. Maintaining allegiance     that is, those within the natural sciences—followed by the big
to one’s school of thought may come to seem more impor-        divide between the natural and the social sciences, and then
tant than openly exploring which explanation seems to work      the even bigger divide between the quantitative and the in-
better in a particular context. This seems to be the case par-    terpretive social sciences.
ticularly within the social sciences, but it is also true for ecol-
                                   Divides within the natural sciences
ogy. The level of complexity of ecological phenomena, and
hence the underdeterminacy of the science, resembles the sit-     Interdisciplinary thinking is easiest between disciplines within
uation in the social sciences. On the other hand, sciences      the natural sciences, but even in this context, it is not pain-
that have developed at the borders of the social–natural di-     less. The first kind of interdisciplinary barrier (difference in
vide (e.g., agronomy in the natural sciences or agricultural eco-   values) is neither directly discernible nor easily separated
nomics in the social sciences) are required to make some       from the second (difference in theories, models, or world-
assumptions about the processes that intrude from the other      views). The judgment about what features of a natural phe-
side (e.g., the decisionmaking process of the farmer or the na-    nomenon are important seems simply a subjective
ture of agroecosystems, respectively). These disciplinary as-     (individual-level) judgment about how to describe reality. But
sumptions about the “other” half of the system constitute       when this process is carried out in the context of applied
simplistic models that must be abandoned and replaced by       science questions, it becomes clear that the question has two
more complex ones.                          parts: a value judgment about what features are of ultimate
  The third type of barrier is the one that has been most em-    concern or importance to society (such as productivity of use-
phasized in the literature on interdisciplinarity: the differences  ful plant species) and a more “scientific” judgment about
in epistemology and hence in specific methods, notions of ad-     what variables or features are most relevant in the effort to de-
equate proof, and other fundamental assumptions of differ-      scribe how these socially important features change (e.g.,
ent fields. As Bauer (1990) puts it,“Scientists (and engineers)    trophic structure of the community, species composition,
believe implicitly in certain absolute truths, and further be-    or physiology of individual species). Answers to the first
lieve that given enough time and effort the ultimate truth can    question are shaped by the individual’s normative concerns,
be found, whereas for some philosophers, sociologists and       by the cultural trends within his or her subdisciplinary com-
other [social scientists] there is no absolutely determinable     munity, and also by the choice of the descriptive model itself

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                                             Special Roundtable Section

(Lélé and Norgaard 1996). The choice of methods, driven by      identified within disciplinary boundaries, in the belief that
different epistemological assumptions, also differs across      pushing the frontiers of each discipline will eventually lead
subdisciplines within a particular subject area. These judg-     to the convergence of all knowledge. Crossing boundaries to
ments and choices have different implications for work within    solve environmental and development problems distracts
and across disciplines.                       from pure research, where academic prestige is still highest.
  When scientists from two different natural sciences try to    Some funding agencies are trying to break down the hierar-
work together, differences in value judgments and models       chy of pure over applied science as they increasingly support
manifest in the form of what we call “mismatched tax-        applied research in their attempt to address pressing problems
onomies.” Scientists working in a subdiscipline often tend to    of environmental change and poverty. Nevertheless, we be-
believe that their particular way of categorizing phenomena     lieve that the motivation for crossing disciplinary boundaries
(taxonomic system) is the best way of characterizing reality,    even within the natural sciences remains generally low.
rather than being open to different ways of representing re-
ality that might be more or less appropriate in different ap-    Bridging the big divide: Linking
plied contexts. For instance, for years soil scientists have been  the natural to the social
debating as to which system of soil taxonomy is the best.      The divide between the two major disciplinary blocks (the
The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) soil taxonomy sys-      natural and the social sciences) is large and multidimen-
tem appears to have won the battle and become the most com-     sional. All four of the types of barriers identified above have
monly accepted classification. But if the purpose of soil      significant explanatory value.
classification is to relate soil types to forest vegetation types
or agricultural fertility, the USDA soil taxonomy is not very    The value-laden nature of science. What starts out in the pure
useful. Indeed, when soil scientists shift from working on      sciences as only a problem of subjective choice of taxonomies
fertility questions in agricultural soils to working on sus-     or models burgeons into the issue of the value-laden nature
tainability questions in forests, they may have to change not    of natural science when working on phenomena of social rel-
only their taxonomy but also their methods (typical soil       evance. But most natural scientists have been brought up on
depths sampled, parameters analyzed, etc.). But once the
                                   the notion that science is value neutral. This belief proves to
problem of mismatched taxonomies is recognized and ad-
                                   be a barrier both to working across disciplines and to doing
dressed, communicating across disciplines in the natural sci-
                                   good science.
ences becomes quite easy.
                                    Take the example of forest management. Tropical forests
  Collaboration between particular types of scientists within
                                   contribute a variety of benefits, but these benefits flow to dif-
the same broad area can also be difficult. Within the biolog-
                                   ferent groups in society. Some of these benefits, such as fuel-
ical sciences, in particular, there are significant differences in
                                   wood, fodder, leaf manure, timber, and minor produce, may
the models used to study the same processes. This is largely
                                   flow to communities living close to the forests, while water-
due to the difficulties of holding many factors constant in liv-
                                   shed services flow primarily to those living in the plains
ing systems and investigating particular factors in the mode
                                   downstream, and carbon sequestration benefits accrue to
of reductionist science. Thus, ecologists have to make some
                                   the entire global community. Different ways of managing
strong assumptions about how a system works, and the as-
                                   forests yield different mixes of benefits. Dense, undisturbed
sumptions differ between approaches or schools. Energetics
                                   forests yield high levels of biodiversity and watershed services,
models and their underlying assumptions, for example, dif-
                                   but little by way of tangible products. Carefully managed,
fer fundamentally from the models and assumptions in com-
                                   lopped forests might yield high levels of fuelwood, fodder, and
munity ecology, akin to the differences among patterns of
                                   leaf manure, but reduced levels of biodiversity and medium
thinking in the social sciences. To some extent, these as-
                                   levels of watershed benefits. Monocultural timber planta-
sumptions are adjusted through tacit knowledge gained from
                                   tions, on the other hand, would maximize timber production
experience. Generally, natural scientists are fairly cognizant
                                   at the expense of most other benefits. Some of the benefits gen-
of and comfortable with their differences with one another,
                                   erated by forests, such as fodder or fuel, may also result from
compared to their differences with social scientists. Natural
                                   nonforest land uses, such as coffee plantations or croplands.
scientists are relatively open to working with each others’
                                   Thus, prioritizing forests over other land uses, and certain for-
judgments, and generally able to make the necessary con-
                                   est management systems over others, means valuing certain
ceptual adjustments.
                                   benefits and certain beneficiaries over others. When one de-
  The main barrier to interdisciplinary work—for exam-
                                   cides which mix of benefits is correct, one is deciding how the
ple, to a collaboration between a botanist and a soil scientist—
                                   diverse needs of different sections of society and of present
lies in the relative absence of motivation. This in turn is
                                   versus future generations should be valued. This decision is
related to the last of the common barriers discussed in the pre-
                                   essentially a social or political one. Science can illuminate this
vious section, namely, the link between science and society and
                                   social debate by generating a clearer estimate of the trade-offs
the structure of academia. Most scientists do not see the low
                                   and complementarities between different benefits, but science
level of cross-disciplinary collaboration as a problem. Most
are happily addressing the questions that have already been     cannot settle the debate.

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  Furthermore, as noted earlier, judgments about what is      were degraded (à la MacGregor 1894) and then tried hard,
socially valuable (what kind of forest should be sustained      but with limited success, to explain why these individually
over what period of time) are almost inextricably linked to the   controlled forests suffered a tragedy that is supposed to be
subjective choices of the dependent variables, the likely set of   restricted to the “commons” (Lélé 2000).
independent variables, the functional form of the model,        On the other hand, when social scientists do point out the
and the scale of analysis. That these are value-loaded choices    possible ways in which natural science may be value laden, nat-
becomes clear when one thinks of how different ecologists      ural scientists are likely to become upset and defensive. For
might respond to the question, “What constitutes a good       instance, in a workshop aimed at exposing economists to
forest?” The chances are that community ecologists might de-     basic hydrology, the hydrology expert introduced the concept
fine this as a highly diverse forest, whereas energetics mod-    of “groundwater potential” and “sustainable utilization.”
elers might define it as a highly productive forest.         The latter was defined as the situation in which groundwa-
  Unfortunately, debates in forestry have often been fruitless   ter extraction does not exceed the rate of groundwater
because they really are normative debates about what should     recharge. At this point, an economist pointed out that this de-
be the goal of forest management, not scientific debates about    finition was debatable, because if communities living in the
which method of forest management will or will not achieve      upper part of the watershed (typically where most of the
a particular goal (or mix of benefits) in a sustainable manner.   rain falls and recharge occurs) were to extract the entire
For instance, in the Western Ghats region of India, colonial     recharge, it would leave no water for downstream communities
foresters in the late 19th century were up in arms against the    or for base flow in the river. The hydrologist took quite some
local practice of lopping or pruning forest trees to obtain leaf   time to understand the empirical point being made and,
manure and fuelwood, and predicted that “such land must be-     even then, insisted that the official definition of sustainable
come utterly barren” and that “ruin and desolation will be the    extraction was “correct.”
outcome” (MacGregor 1894). Foresters and ecologists in
                                   Assumptions about other disciplines. Natural scientists tend
postindependence India seemed to concur. However, rigor-
ous measurements showed that even a century after these dire     to think of disciplinary differences as reflecting primarily
predictions, the extent of barren land was limited, and the pro-   differences in the subject matter studied (and hence to think
ductivity of the intensively lopped forests was much higher     of disciplinary perspectives as complementary). This means
than estimated. Often (though not always) it was sufficient to    they are unprepared for the competition and even open hos-
meet the harvesting pressures (Lélé 1994, 2000). Rather than     tility among social scientists from different fields. The vari-
being a scientific judgment about what harvesting and man-      ous schools of thought in the social sciences address individual
agement practices are sustainable, the foresters’ criticisms     behavior and social interactions, but they do so using differ-
seem to be driven by their underlying value judgment that such    ent assumptions. Furthermore, they may use the same words
intensive use of forests was inherently undesirable.         with different meanings, associated with different historical
  Natural scientists are usually uncomfortable with the idea    lineages. This makes it difficult for natural scientists to know
that “environmentally sound development” is not a self-       which type of social scientist to work with. As a result, we have
evident, value-neutral concept. They have attempted to hang     “interdisciplines” such as ecological anthropology and eco-
on to the cloak of value neutrality in different ways. For in-    logical economics. The ecological models in these interdisci-
stance, in the context of ecosystems, some scientists try to ar-   plines may be the same, but the social science assumptions,
gue that sustaining biodiversity automatically sustains all     models, and language differ. Natural scientists need to expect
other products and services. Some try to portray ecosystem in-    to take considerable time learning the cultures of the differ-
tegrity, ecological health, natural capital, ecological footprint,  ent social sciences if they are even to think about how to put
or a green GDP (gross domestic product), for example, as ob-     together or join an interdisciplinary team, let alone actually
jective measures. One can easily show, however, that the cre-    work with the social science members of the team.
ation of new concepts and aggregate measures in response to       At the same time, natural scientists must unlearn their
a perceived problem does not get rid of value judgments.       implicitly held social science theories. Natural scientists have
Each of these concepts is relevant only with respect to a par-    often been the first to point out environmental problems of
ticular choice of ultimate values or variables of interest, or to  enormous social consequence. Naturally, they participate in,
particular notions of how disparate values should be aggregated   and often lead, societal efforts to address these problems.
(Lélé and Norgaard 1996, Bowker and Star 1999, Rykiel 2001).     Charged with providing policy recommendations, they have
  When we attempt to bridge the big divide, such hidden       to make judgments about how society works. They do not have
value judgments can cause serious problems. When social sci-     adequate training to do this, but they are perhaps emboldened
entists are insensitive to this problem, they may take the nat-   to do so by their position and are likely to adopt simplistic
ural scientists’ assessment at face value, as an objective      models of social dynamics. As a recent article in Nature put
assessment of the quality of resource management, and end      it,“Few of us know much about the dynamics of the cosmos,
up taking their subsequent analysis further astray. For instance,  but we all know plenty about human nature—or at least we
in the case of the heavily used forests in the Western Ghats,    think we do” (Anonymous 2005, p. 1003). Thus, natural
Nadkarni and colleagues (1989) assumed that the forests       scientists have applied models of biological carrying capac-

970 BioScience • November 2005 / Vol. 55 No. 11
                                             Special Roundtable Section

ity to human systems even though, unlike other animals,       assumptions underlying this belief, however, are invalid. Not
human beings constantly innovate and also respond to re-      only has quantitative thinking been extensively adopted in the
source scarcity by varying their levels of consumption enor-    social sciences, but, more important, qualitative thinking can
mously. Natural scientists have used proximity analysis to     be as rigorous as quantitative thinking, and quantitative
assign blame for forest degradation, ignoring the fact that     thinking does not prevent bogus rigor arising out of patently
property rights may shape forest use much more than prox-      wrong assumptions (DeCanio 2003).
imity. And of course natural scientists’ quick recourse to ig-     Of course, perceptions and preferences do not change eas-
norance as an explanation of unexpected or seemingly        ily. Thus, mathematical ecologists have shown a greater will-
irrational behavior by poor communities ignores the logics     ingness to collaborate with mathematical economists than
imposed by poverty. In short, seeming familiarity with social    with other social scientists. But other approaches, such as po-
issues can get in the way of recognition of the rigor and      litical ecology and ecological anthropology, are also flourishing,
depth of the “other” that is necessary for a true cross-      suggesting that the qualitative–quantitative divide is not a fun-
disciplinary collaboration.                     damental barrier to integration across the divide between the
  Belittling the “other,” however, is by no means the preserve   social and natural sciences. Practical constraints might in
of the natural sciences alone. Many social science theories and   fact turn out to be more important. Understanding envi-
their adherents have tended to ignore or underplay the con-     ronmental change caused by human actions (e.g., the effect
straints imposed by natural resources and processes on hu-     of deforestation on hydrology) requires sampling across dif-
man actions. Even today, many economists continue to use      ferent intensities of human-induced environmental changes
arguments based on economic models that assume an infi-       (e.g., watersheds with different levels of deforestation), keep-
nite substitutability among resources through technological     ing other variables (e.g., rainfall and soils) constant. But to un-
change (Lomborg 2001). For others, such as hard-line Marx-     derstand how these environmental changes affect human
ists, technology matters but is entirely determined by social    communities and, more important, what factors influence hu-
factors, so it is not necessary to understand the relationship   man response to environmental change, researchers need
between technologies and environmental systems.           samples wherein the extent of environmental change is sim-
  A first step in countering this problem may be to refer to    ilar (e.g., similarly deforested watersheds) and only one so-
the natural sciences as “unsocial”and the social sciences as “un-  cial factor varies (e.g., the strength of collective-action
natural” as an interdisciplinary team is forming. Acknowl-     institutions). Finding adequate samples of such situations in
edging what each side does not know may help promote the      the real world is virtually impossible, and studying even lim-
individual honesty and humility necessary for all team mem-     ited samples may require enormous resources, leading to
bers to work together. A second step might be a careful choice   tensions about which questions to prioritize.
of linking variables that simultaneously capture the critical
                                  The social standing of the social and natural sciences. There
social aspects of natural processes and the critical natural as-
pects of social practices. Forest ecologists studying the impact  are significant differences in the manner in which society treats
of fuelwood collection on forests should distinguish between    the social and natural sciences (and disciplines within them).
differences in harvesting practices, such as the ratio of green   These differences are reflected in the incentives and support
wood to deadwood extraction or the girth of saplings felled,    provided for, attention paid to, and hence attitudes culti-
rather than simply focusing on tons of biomass (Lélé 1993).     vated toward the two disciplinary blocks. In most countries,
Hydrologists should identify exactly which portion of stream-    the natural science–social science divide is reinforced early on.
flow or infiltration is useful to which community, rather      India, where the first author is located, is perhaps an ex-
than giving gross values for these variables. And political sci-  treme case, where students are forced to choose between
entists should be more sensitive to the ecological dynamics     “science” and “arts” as early as the 11th year of schooling, and
of a resource before trying to link group size or other variables  where the exposure to the arts, humanities, and social sciences
to the presence of collective action. In the long run, one can   in the undergraduate science-related programs is minimal and
expect this interaction to change the individual disciplinary    their status minimized. The undergraduate courses in the so-
models to some extent. For instance, detailed research on pas-   cial sciences are completely bereft of the “natural.” The liberal
toral communities in the Sahel by ecological anthropolo-      arts approach to education in the United States may be at the
gists has contributed as much to overturning the equilibrium    other end of the spectrum, but the divide is still present.
model of grassland ecosystems in favor of the disturbance       More than just lack of exposure to the “other,” it is the clear
model as has research by ecologists (Mace 1991).          signals of superiority or inferiority that are communicated to
                                  academicians (and by them to their students) that are a prob-
Epistemological and methodological mismatches. Much has       lem. Many societies, especially Asian ones, are constantly
been said about the epistemological differences between the     telling students that, when choosing between science and
two disciplinary blocks as well as those within the social sci-   the arts and humanities, “science” is superior to “arts.” This
ences (Kanbur 2001). There is a general belief that natural sci-  signal is reinforced at the undergraduate stage by the half-
ence is quantitative and therefore rigorous, whereas social     hearted manner in which the social sciences are taught in most
science is qualitative and therefore not rigorous. Most of the   professional courses. Naturally, the social sciences are seen as

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                   Box 1. Forget disciplines, think scientific communities.

Disciplines are academic administrative artifacts. There is both a great deal in common across disciplines and much variety within them. In
the social sciences, market economic models are used in economics, anthropology, history, sociology, political science, public policy, and even
psychology; those from different disciplines who use these models may have more in common with each other than with those from the same
departments who use Marxist perspectives. The biological sciences have reorganized over the past quarter-century, dropping the historic dis-
ciplinary distinctions, for example, between the plant and animal world and organizing more on levels of analysis from the gene to the or-
ganism to the ecosystem. Yet evolutionary biology cuts across all levels of analysis, and ecologists use genetic techniques to understand ecological
systems and processes. Thus the structure of scientific knowledge and the differences in epistemologies, theories, and methods among sci-
entists have little to do with what have historically been called disciplines. So, when approaching collaborative work between scientists, for-
get disciplines; think scientific communities.
A scientific community is a group of scholars who share a characteristic. The characteristic may be in one or more of the following epistemic
categories:
• Subject focus (e.g., a species, economic systems, a region, or society and technology). Some universities have regional studies pro-
  grams, society and technology programs, or other interdisciplinary institutions with faculty participating from multiple depart-
  ments.
• Assumptions about underlying characteristics of the factors they study (e.g., the assumption that individuals are rational utility
  maximizers and a population can be understood as the sum of its individuals or, alternatively, that culture guides individual behav-
  ior and individuals can only be understood in the context of their culture).
• Assumptions about the larger world they do not study, and about how what they do study relates to the larger world (e.g., the
  assumption that the external environment is predictable because it is constant or exhibits regular patterns, or is unpredictable
  because it is complex or chaotic; the assumption that the long run is not important, or need not be considered, because technologi-
  cal progress is unpredictable or offsets resource scarcity). Such framing assumptions can serve as rationales for not considering
  more systemic questions.
• The models they use (e.g., mechanical, hierarchical, evolutionary, narrative). Note that, in the current climate of academia, formal
  models, especially mathematical models, give more credibility to a community.
• The methods they use (e.g., mathematical, statistical, interpretive, ethnographic).
• The audience they strive to inform through their research (e.g., other academics, policymakers, professional practitioners, a demo-
   cratic public, corporations).
Holding a common characteristic in any of these categories can be a source of scholarly community. Scholars who use statistical techniques
can share their statistical knowledge without having to share anything in the other five categories. Two scholars who work in the Amazon can
usually talk for hours, even if they differ in the other categories. Of course, if the Amazon scholars start to argue over Adam Smith versus Karl
Marx, their camaraderie can quickly break down. Clearly, sharing characteristics in more categories reduces differences and provides a
stronger sense of community. Scholars within a tight community can work easily together because of all that they share, but the scholars who
are most dependent on the security of sharing characteristics across the different categories are least able to work with scholars from other
communities.
Note that not all combinations of characteristics across the categories are possible. Looking at a subject as a separate entity (individualism,
atomism, or reductionism) and using mechanistic models are compatible with statistical techniques of analysis. Interpretive methods and story-
telling are consistent with seeing everything as contextual (place specific), contingent (dependent on history), and interlinked.
                                                                    (continued)

irrelevant, boring, and nonrigorous. Conversely, the social sci-        climate change are ultimately highly social. Not surprisingly,
entists, because they purportedly were not good enough to get          then, it is economics—the social science discipline that has
into the “science stream,” are often in awe of the natural sci-         modeled itself consciously on the natural sciences—that is
ences. The belief of the superiority of the natural scientists is        considered by laypeople and politicians alike as superior to
so deep-rooted that whenever social problems have the slight-          other social sciences.
est technical dimension, politicians have traditionally called
                                        Bridging the even bigger divide: Interdisciplinarity
on only technicians—the natural scientists—to help solve
                                        within the social sciences
them. Social scientists were only invited into the US National
Academy of Sciences in the 1950s, when natural scientists dis-         We, the authors, have straddled the big divide between the nat-
covered they could use their help (Simon 1996). Until the lat-         ural and social sciences for some time and also have been in-
ter half of the 20th century in the developed world, and            volved in various efforts to promote interdisciplinary research
more recently in the developing world, most governmen-             on the environment. We can now attest that it is frequently
tal committees on natural resource management were con-             harder to bridge deep divisions within the social sciences
stituted solely of natural scientists and engineers. The            than between the natural sciences and particular social sci-
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or IPCC,               ences. Economists, sociologists, and anthropologists, for ex-
was initiated by (and its leadership is dominated by) nat-           ample, may find it easier to interact with environmental
ural scientists, even though the origins and impacts of             scientists than to work with one another. When multiple

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                                                   Special Roundtable Section

(Box 1, continued)


Understanding how the parts of the scientific endeavor do or do not fit together is another important concern for interdisciplinary commu-
nities. Some scholars are sure the sciences will unify; they seek that unity, and are convinced that the current disunity means some scholarly
communities must be wrong. Other scholars are comfortable with the disunity of knowledge; they are methodological pluralists, and are not
disturbed by competing, and sometimes contradictory, insights. Either type of scholar may be able to work with other scholars of the same
type (unifying or pluralistic) on a problem that requires cooperation between other characteristics of communities, but there are serious ten-
sions when scholars of different persuasions with respect to the unity of knowledge try to cooperate in an interdisciplinary effort.
These categories do not exhaust the criteria that define scientific communities. Scholars in the philosophy and sociology of science have de-
veloped a variety of insights into the ways in which personal networks, specific practices, and various forms of tacit knowledge characterize
the organization of the modern scientific enterprise, as well as the ways in which that organization has changed over time (see box 2 in Nor-
gaard and Baer [2005b] for some useful citations). Our point here is to highlight some of the most salient characteristics that facilitate or im-
pede interdisciplinary communication.
Strong scientific communities actively demarcate and defend their boundaries. Most scientific communities are constantly defining themselves,
reinforcing why their knowledge is credible, and seeking recognition, authority, and power. Such active communities tout the strengths of their
approach to truth and reassert the superiority of their answers. Scholars who drift too far from commonly held characteristics of the com-
munity—perhaps in the assumptions they make or their orientation with respect to those they serve, and hence in the nature of the claims
about truth that they make—are actively defined as being outside of the community. Praising the good work of those who best represent the
community and what it has to say and weeding out those who stray is a part of the process of sustaining the identity and credibility of the
community. This means that the social needs of the community can get in the way of openly acknowledging the limits of the particular as-
sumptions or models favored by the community, impeding critical thinking and innovation.
Interdisciplinarity is about working across boundaries. The boundaries are those that define communities and that communities are constantly
trying to enforce, so being aware of the different types of boundaries helps one see more clearly the ways in which scholars are different and
the sorts of boundaries that need to be overcome, or at least recognized, to work together. Clearly, when there are many boundaries to over-
come, it is especially hard to work together. It is also important to recognize the social dynamics of communities, the ways in which they re-
inforce their identity and credibility through boundary building and enforcement. When first trying to work with a scholar from another
community, it is important to be respectful of that community’s traditions and to be aware of the limitations of one’s own perspective.
Although interdisciplinary scholars must initially learn how to cross boundaries, once there is a significant set of scholars crossing a common
set of boundaries, or once a smaller number of scholars organizes themselves to encourage others to do so, they are subject to the same so-
cial needs to define the boundaries and assert the credibility of the new community. This may be academically necessary and even useful, but
can also stifle attempts at new crossings in the long run.
In sum, it is crucial to recognize that while simple maps of the scientific enterprise still match the organizational charts of universities, these
are far from the most important markers of difference and similarity that interdisciplinary scholarship must address. Commonalities exist at
many different scales and in many dimensions; scientific communities are both nested and overlapping. Understanding these complexities
can make the problem seem tougher at the outset, but should make it easier in practice.



strains of social scientists all work on the same topic, they seem       of rights, or income, result in different combinations of effi-
to talk past each other. The reasons include all four of the main       cient market prices.
barriers to interdisciplinarity discussed above.                 Other social scientists are less likely to insist that their po-
                                        sition is value neutral, but they are nonetheless rarely explicit
Hidden values. Of all the social scientists, mainstream econ-         about what values they espouse, and thus end up talking past
omists are most prone to holding on to illusions of value neu-         each other. In a detailed review of the literature on common
trality, albeit in disguise. For instance, mainstream welfare         property resources, Menon (1999) has pointed out how dif-
economists aggregate costs and benefits across disparate sec-         ferent streams in this literature talk past each other because
tions of society to come up with a measure of net changes in          their underlying normative concerns are different: the col-
aggregate social welfare. In virtually all valuation studies and        lective-action stream focuses on efficiency improvements
cost–benefit analyses, this aggregation is done by simple           in resource management, the environmentalist stream focuses
addition (i.e., assuming that the effect of an additional dol-         on ecological prudence or sustainability, and the poverty
lar to the poor is the same as to the rich). When confronted,         stream focuses on the distributive impacts, that is, on impacts
these economists acknowledge that this additive construction          of common property resource degradation on the poor.
of social welfare function is not value neutral, but there are         One can detect a reasonably clear correlation between these
only a few examples of studies in which a social welfare func-         three schools and their disciplinary roots: the collective-
tion is calculated in different ways to represent different pos-        action approach is linked to the rational-choice ideas in
sible value positions (for an example, see Howarth 2001). The         mainstream economics and political science, the environ-
pervasive discourse about “getting prices right” is another il-        mentalist approach has strong links with the natural
lustration. The belief that there is one right price contra-          sciences, and the poverty approach is closer to the anthro-
dicts basic economic theory, because different distributions          pologists and sociologists. The correlation is certainly not 100

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Special Roundtable Section

                                    One approach to interdisciplinarity in the social sciences
percent, but the fundamental problem remains. Much aca-
                                  might be to assume that all these explanations have general
demic debate on the commons starts off on the wrong foot
                                  validity, but that in specific cases one explanation may be su-
by not explicating what each participant’s normative concerns
                                  perior to the others. Underlying this approach is a view of hu-
and priorities are, and by failing to recognize how participants’
                                  man beings as having multiple personalities: the economic
individual models make it difficult to accommodate other
                                  personality asserts itself in the market, the political one in elec-
normative concerns.
                                  tions, and some other personality in the interaction between
                                  the genders. Sometimes human beings are driven by mater-
Competing explanations. The problem of interdisciplinarity
                                  ial considerations and sometimes by cultural factors. This may
within the social sciences cannot, unfortunately, be solved sim-
                                  be related to the traditional idea that different disciplines ex-
ply by choosing a common set of values or variables of con-
                                  plain human behavior at different levels: the household, the
cern. All social science disciplines are ultimately attempting
                                  community, the nation, and so on. In this situation, one
to understand the same broad phenomenon, human behav-
                                  needs some kind of metatheoretical procedure for deter-
ior. At the cost of some simplification, one might say that each
                                  mining a priori which one of several possible explanations is
social science discipline (or subdiscipline) makes different
                                  likely to be appropriate in a specific context. To use such a pro-
assumptions about the key driver or drivers of human be-
                                  cedure, researchers would need to train extensively in differ-
havior. Mainstream economists believe the key driver is ma-
                                  ent social science theories, without absorbing the dogmas
terial benefits, certain schools within sociology believe it is
                                  associated with each theory, so that they could pick and
power, and certain schools within anthropology believe it is
                                  choose depending on the situation.
cultural norms and value systems. These basic assumptions
                                    Eventually, social scientists need to figure out ways of
are not prima facie mutually incompatible, and no doubt dif-
                                  working with several theoretical frameworks that may be si-
ferent combinations of interactive phenomena are more im-
                                  multaneously plausible. For instance, the failure of a partic-
portant at different levels of explanation. They are, of course,
                                  ular institution of common-pool resource management may
incompatible within any simple model. Disagreements within
                                  be rooted both in the norms inherent in cultural explanations
the social sciences, however, are therefore extremely deep-
                                  and in the disproportionate distribution of power assumed
rooted, in part because of a mistaken belief (left over from
                                  in political economy explanations. Given the differences in
19th-century physics) that social phenomena ought to be
                                  scale of operation of these factors, testing such multicausal
explained, or largely explained, by a few universal principles.
                                  frameworks through some kind of statistically rigorous ap-
  Different explanations of environmental degradation il-
                                  proach is an insurmountable task through formal analysis. This
lustrate how social science disciplines compete. Neoclassical
                                  means that researchers who address multicausal, interacting
economists insist that the problem lies in missing markets or
                                  phenomena must rely on an open discourse to take advan-
in the improper setting of prices of resources and pollutants.
                                  tage of the different theoretical frameworks and tacit knowl-
Political economists focus on the fact that different economic
                                  edge associated with different fields, and to come to a
classes have different levels of access to natural resources,    measured, qualified judgment.
and the material consumption and pollution by the power-        The epistemological and hence methodological divide
ful classes comes at the cost of the less powerful. Institution-  separating mainstream economists from anthropologists
alists explain resource degradation in terms of the failure of   and other interpretive social scientists—with economists
institutions to properly assign rights and responsibilities so   equating rigor with quantitative methods and mathematical
that market and other systemic failures do not occur. Ecofem-    models— is quite well known (Bardhan 1989). It explains why
inists have argued that environmental degradation is related    mathematical ecologists find it easiest to collaborate with
to the domination of women by men, while anthropologists      economists (Perrings et al. 1995), whereas natural historians
have argued that it is related to how human beings perceive     are perhaps more comfortable working with anthropolo-
their relationship with nature. Mahatma Gandhi pointed       gists (Maffi 2001). Sadly, this divide has even manifested it-
out that “there is enough for every man’s need but not every    self within recent efforts to address environmental issues
man’s greed,” suggesting (somewhat like an anthropologist)     from within economics, with hard-nosed “environmental”
that we have to look within ourselves and our value systems     economists (especially in the United States) finding it
rather than the structure of society for the causes of envi-    difficult to accept the contributions of the more pluralistic
ronmental degradation. This is not to deny that some very in-    “ecological” economists.
teresting and fruitful disciplinary crossings are taking place     The higher social standing of economics vis-à-vis other
within the social sciences. But they do not seem to have af-    social science disciplines, and the consequent tensions between
fected the mainstreams in the disciplines. The reason may be    these disciplines, is also something that has been commented
that the very identities of some of the disciplines or subdis-   upon, with the hierarchy being strongest in developing coun-
ciplines rest on the belief that their own explanatory model    tries such as India. This may be partly explained by the ap-
or method is the superior one. This is certainly true of the    parent quantitative rigor and exact prediction that economics
mainstream economists and their rational choice model,       shares with the natural sciences. But the main explanation may
which has had a hegemonic position in the social sciences.     lie in the commonality of values and worldviews between a

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                                               Special Roundtable Section

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