Adger et al 2006 Ecology and Society
Copyright © 2006 by the author(s). Published here under license by the Resilience Alliance.
Adger, W. N., K. Brown, and E. L. Tompkins. 2005. The political economy of cross-scale networks in
resource co-management. Ecology and Society 10(2): 9. [online] URL:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol10/iss2/art9/
Insight, part of a Special Feature on Scale and Cross-scale Dynamics
The Political Economy of Cross-Scale Networks in Resource Co-
Management
W. Neil Adger1, Katrina Brown2, and Emma L. Tompkins2
ABSTRACT. We investigate linkages between stakeholders in resource management that occur at different
spatial and institutional levels and identify the winners and losers in such interactions. So-called cross-
scale interactions emerge because of the benefits to individual stakeholder groups in undertaking them or
the high costs of not undertaking them. Hence there are uneven gains from cross-scale interactions that are
themselves an integral part of social-ecological system governance. The political economy framework
outlined here suggests that the determinants of the emergence of cross-scale interactions are the exercise
of relative power between stakeholders and their costs of accessing and creating linkages. Cross-scale
interactions by powerful stakeholders have the potential to undermine trust in resource management
arrangements. If government regulators, for example, mobilize information and resources from cross-level
interactions to reinforce their authority, this often disempowers other stakeholders such as resource users.
Offsetting such impacts, some cross-scale interactions can be empowering for local level user groups in
creating social and political capital. These issues are illustrated with observations on resource management
in a marine protected area in Tobago in the Caribbean. The case study demonstrates that the structure of
the cross-scale interplay, in terms of relative winners and losers, determines its contribution to the resilience
of social-ecological systems.
Key Words: Caribbean; institutions; marine protected areas; natural resource management; power; social-
ecological resilience; transaction costs.
2002). Yet we argue in this paper that it is important
INTRODUCTION to recognize the winners and losers from cross-scale
interactions on the basis of the exercise of power
We address here the political economy of the through domination, resistance, and co-operation.
evolution of cross scale linkages. We suggest that
cross-scale linkages evolve and are maintained by An understanding of cross-scale linkages is
the organizations and institutions involved in important in managing multiple use resources. By
resource management to further their own interests. linkages we mean direct interactions through
Rational choice analysis has always suggested that networks to provide information or tangible
collective action between directly interested parties resources related to the management system. Of
in any decision, given the power relations between course almost all possible natural resources systems
them, does not come about without perceived gain involve multiple direct users. Even when direct
through the bargain. By the same logic, cross-scale users of resources are small in number or strictly
interactions come about only because it is in the limited, there are inevitably multiple external
interest of one or other of the stakeholders involved stakeholders making claims and calls on natural
to develop and to maintain these linkages. Such an resources at numerous scales. Cross-scale
account does not, however, explain all social institutional linkages are the norm and even
interaction between stakeholders in resource
management. Nor can self-interest predict the shape
of interactions in every context (Richerson et al.
1
Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, 2University of East Anglia
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universal in natural resource management (Berkes at the same time, offsetting linkages facilitate the
2002). empowerment of local user groups.
Part of this trend towards multiple competing claims
stems from processes of integration of localities, A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LINKAGES
societies, and economies in multi-level governance
and economic systems. In a globalized world,
environmental services and functions are The structure of interplay in resource co-
increasingly seen as public goods. They have management
multiple beneficiaries and claims to them at national
and global levels. Many ecosystem services, such The overview paper to this special issue explores
as carbon sequestration functions, the maintenance how cross-scale and cross-level dynamics can take
of the world's stock of genetic biological resources, different forms (Cash et al. 2005). From the realm
and shared water resources are all portrayed as of international agreements through to local level
public goods with a value to global society (Dietz governance of institutions, there are particular
et al. 2003). Inevitably then, markets are created to patterns of interaction. These interactions between
generate incentives for conserving the atmosphere, stakeholders are widely observed (Berkes 2002),
water, habitats, or species, for the benefit of but they are also widely promoted as solutions to
stakeholders remote from the resources. Direct sustainability of community-based management
resource users are drawn into market exchanges (Brown 2003, Berkes 2004). They are promoted
where previously their relationship to resources may because shared responsibility for management of
have been based on stewardship, self-interest, or resources creates positive incentives for sustainable
other forms of value (O'Neill 2001). Hence the use and overcomes problems of legitimacy from
scope for cross-scale linkages has multiplied with traditional resource management.
the increasing interdependence and global linkages
in the world economy. In some cases, the imposition of “traditional”
resource management (Fig. 1) by government
In effect we question whether integrated and well- agencies who define social and environmental goals
linked resource systems (nested within national and for resource management could be judged as “top
international agendas, regimes, networks, and legal down” management. In such cases, a regulatory
systems) are a priori more robust or resilient than framework is imposed on resource users, with the
those with greater autonomy and less linkages. “imposers” often impervious to feedback or
Anderies and colleagues (2004) argue that failure learning from resource users and civil society.
of the links between resources, governance systems, Figure 1 shows linkages between individual agents
and their associated infrastructures reduce the in the communities. Such local level linkages for
robustness of a social-ecological system. In this resource management are independent of the
paper, we address in particular the links between regulatory framework and indeed networks often
elements of the governance of social-ecological develop to substitute for de iure regulations or act
systems: these are the links between resource users to circumvent them (Pretty and Ward 2001, Pretty
on the one hand, and regulators and government 2004).
agencies on the other (Anderies et al. 2004). We
argue that part of the persistence and stability of the One of the main problems identified with the top-
governance system depends on the distribution of down model of interaction between government
benefits from cross-scale linkages, demonstrated by agencies and resource users in Figure 1 is that these
the ability of the system to command legitimacy and so-called “traditional” resource management
trust among the resource user and the governmental practices lead to locked-in patterns of resource use.
stakeholders. If the structure of cross-scale linkages These patterns are often detrimental to the ability to
reduces trust then the robustness of the system is in adapt to surprise and shock: management based
question. In empirical research, we examine the solely on the stability of systems creates its own
structure of interplay of cross-scale linkages in the pathologies of risk (Holling and Meffe 1996).
context of a marine protected area in Tobago in the Carpenter et al. (2001) propose that rather than
eastern Caribbean. We argue that the benefits from seeking adaptation decisions that maximize
emerging and dynamic linkages are frequently efficient use of resources at one time scale, a more
uneven, often reinforcing existing inequalities. But, desirable normative goal should be the enhancement
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Fig. 1. A representation of traditional resource management interactions between government and resource
users.
of resilience of social-ecological resource systems management is de rigeur and promoted throughout
to allow for flexibility and perseverance of a system the world through decentralization of control from
in a state that provides resources and services to government agencies to institutions and committees
users. of so-called co-management of resources. There are
a number of benefits to the co-management of
The system of resource management portrayed in resources, defined here as shared responsibility
Figure 1 is a stylized representation that is, it between institutions of the state and of local
appears, at odds with much rhetoric on conservation resource users. Co-management can lead to reduced
practice throughout the world. Community-based enforcement costs, the sharing of knowledge and
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Figure 2. Interactions between government and civil society in co-management arrangements.
Brown et al. 2002.
information on the resource, and systematic users and markets. With appropriate governance
learning between all parties. This situation is structure for sharing rights and responsibilities for
portrayed in Figure 2, contrasting with ‘traditional’ management, there are more direct linkages
resource management depicted in Figure 1, with the between agents of government and resource users,
two main protagonists being institutions of the state while information and learning processes flow
(top) and the community (bottom). Under co- between them (Fig. 2).
management, the resource users retain their internal
linkages and horizontal linkages to other resource
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Co-management of resources is not a panacea for to overcome inertia and trigger change (Cash et al.
robustness. There are particular areas of resource 2005). Some of the determinants of cross-scale
conservation where participatory management is, in interaction are better understood than others. The
effect, a new received wisdom. Yet the devolution nature of the resources being managed clearly
of responsibility often comes without devolution of affects, to some degree, the institutional design. The
rights (Adams et al. 2003, Brown 2003). In the size of the resources, the physical pressure on
developing world in particular, the popularity of exploitation, the cost of enforcement, and the static
community-based management may have arisen or fugitive nature of resources all play a part in
because of the reduction of resources and determining the governance structures of collective
effectiveness of the state and its inability to mobilize resources (Dolšak and Ostrom 2003). These same
resources to provide public infrastructure. But the factors are likely to be important in determining the
resources are similarly not available for the new cross-scale interactions that form part of the
institutions of co-management (Ribot 2002). In such institutions of governance, and have been proposed
circumstances, cross-scale interactions that develop by Anderies et al. (2004) as important design
do so as a substitute rather than as a complement to elements for robust social-ecological systems.
good governance (Cooke and Kothari 2001).
Figure 3 portrays the range of cross-scale
There have been a number of reviews of experience interactions that are commonly observed in co-
of co-management (Berkes et al. 2001, Brown et al. management arrangements in addition to the
2002) and attempts to explain “best practice” within linkages between state and local community (as
resource co-management (Berkes 2004). These portrayed in Figure 2). Local level resource users
have focused on the legitimacy of the interactions make common cause with communities in the same
between resource users and government agencies situation to learn lessons and spread best practice,
and on the incorporation of local and scientific as well as to act cooperatively in bargaining with
knowledge into management. Olsson et al. (2004) government. These are portrayed as horizontal
and Tompkins et al. (2002) have hypothesized pre- linkages between resource users, other civil society
requisites for sustained interaction between groups and scientific organizations, media and
stakeholders in co-management that include: (1) advocacy organizations both within and external to
enabling constitutional order and legislation, (2) the the locality and jurisdiction of the resources (Fig.
ability for organizations to monitor and adapt their 3). Similarly, government agencies involved in
co-management experiments, and (3) the presence resource management frequently have horizontal
of leaders and agents for change. linkages to cognate departments and organizations.
Vertical external linkages portrayed in Figure 3
Design principles for cross-scale interaction are include those by both communities and agencies to
only part of the story. Berkes (2002) argues that government and regulatory agencies at other levels.
virtually all resource management systems have
some external linkages and drivers at different
scales. He argues that a failure to recognize these Power relations determine the nature of
linkages is a central reason for some unsuccessful interaction
interventions in resource systems and that the
persistence of resource degradation may be in part The arrows in Figure 3 show the existence of cross-
related to ‘cross-scale institutional pathologies’: “it scale interactions. But these cross-scale interactions
is useful to start with the assumption that a given can take different forms. Young (2002, 2005)
resource management system is multi-scale and that classifies the interactions between institutions at
it should be managed at different scales different levels (i.e., vertical interplay) as being in
simultaneously” (Berkes 2002:317). the form of dominance, separation, merger,
negotiated outcome, or systemic change by both
The linkages between resource stakeholders at parties. We hypothesize that the form of these
different scales are then determined by the structure interactions is determined by both the power
of the vertical and horizontal interplay between relations inherent within them and the transactions
actors; the characteristics of the resource being costs associated with them.
managed; aspects of agency such as the emergence
of leadership and the translation of knowledge at First, power and the exercise of power determine
different levels; and the social construction of crisis how cross-scale interactions occur. The analysis of
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Figure 3. Cross scale linkages in resource management.
Co-management institutions instigate linkages to other regulators and users. They also promote vertical
linkages to access knowledge, resources, and other forms of legitimacy.
power is widespread and contested within the social aspects of power relating to tactical exercises of
sciences. But at its core there is an understanding of power through mechanisms of social interaction
power as the application of action, knowledge, and and, on the other hand, structural implications of
resources to resolve problems and further interests power that are manifested through the distribution
(Lukes 1974, Few 2002). Few (2002) makes a key of resources and influence. Thus power may be
distinction between, on the one hand, sociological exercised through different mechanisms at different
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temporal and spatial scales. Peterson (2000) has
argued for a simple hierarchy: the exercise of power The negative implications of cross-scale linkages
at local levels is overt and power at higher temporal on the less powerful can, however, be offset by other
and spatial scales is always covert or structural types of linkage. Some forms of both vertical and
(Lukes 1974). This does not seem to be supportable. horizontal interaction promote and facilitate so-
Clearly different manifestations of power are not called “political capital” (Birner and Wittmer 2003).
scale dependent in time or space because power is Community interactions in co-management and in
in the very fabric of social systems and resides in vertical interplay with other institutions have been
every perception, judgement, and act, no matter shown in particular circumstances to side benefits
what the context (Foucault 1986, Few 2002). Power of politicizing and empowering the local level
is embedded in the ideas and discourses that frame institutions. Hence the vertical interplay, depending
the resource management problem in hand and on its structure, can change the nature of the bargain
operates largely independent of scale (Pritchard and and power relations between stakeholders. Birner
Sanderson 2002). and Wittmer (2003) argue that the high level of
political mobilization of the rural population of
Hence the important elements of power in Thailand who were involved in community forestry
determining the interactions between actors across practices was so significant that it helped to
scales are how decisions are negotiated, how trade- strengthen the nation's democratic institutions at
offs are made to give room for manoeuvre, and how crucial periods over the past decades [see Sneddon
other actors are enrolled on a cause (Arce and Long (2003), however, on the contested definitions of
1992). Knowledge is a key resource in the exercises political power in this context]. Birner and Wittmer
of power: it is used by both dominant parties and by (2003) show that social capital built through shared
those resisting action. Actors across social and resource management can give impetus to political
temporal scales use these same mechanisms in the action through a number of mechanisms.
exercise of power.
Social interaction in resource management provide
The issues of power within cross-scale interactions platforms for political participation, foster political
are illustrated in the case of political linkages by ideas, as well as more fundamental issues of
rubber tappers in Amazonia. Brown and Rosendo building skills for public debate and knowledge of
(2000) outline the strategies of community-based political processes. These potential gains from
organizations of small scale rubber tappers in vertical interplay for the less powerful stakeholder
Rondonia in Brazil in promoting their interest groups are a counterpoint to the coercive dominance
through bypassing local governance structures. of some forms of linkage. The institutions of co-
They show that the rubber tappers successfully management, in effect, exhibit cross-scale linkages
recruited the resources of international organizations, that can potentially subvert assumed power
including the World Bank in “levelling the playing hierarchies from top to bottom in institutional scale.
field” with state and federal government agencies.
The linkages they adopted (vertical linkages in Fig. The second element in the political economy of how
3) allowed them to deploy both information and cross-scale interactions occur is the cost of
resources to renegotiate their sphere of influence in knowledge. The cost of obtaining knowledge is a
resource management and to secure their key element itself in the calculus of power. In
livelihoods. But such international alliances are institutional economics, these costs are known as
potentially fragile. In this case, they posed political transaction costs and are made of up the costs
risks for the grassroots organizations in their associated with searching for information,
dealings with government (Conklin and Graham searching for partners in collective action, drawing
1995). Government agencies, usually dominant in up and enforcing contracts, and building up
their relationship with the rubber tappers' networks and social capital. In neo-classical
organizations, lost trust in the existing institutions economics, transactions costs relate primarily to the
of governance, excluded the local resource users, costs of exchange and search within markets.
and set up their own cross-scale interactions to re- Hence, neo-classical economics portrays such costs
establish their dominance. Thus cross-scale as a drag on efficiency. But there are broader
interactions are always negotiated outcomes of transaction costs in social interactions around
power relations, reaffirming the hierarchies of environmental and resource management. The
institutions and actors. desired outcomes of environmental management
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such as the maintenance of ecosystem services and views see Baland and Platteau 1999, Agrawal 2001,
resilience are more often public rather than private Adams et al. 2003). Hence we argue that particular
goods (Eggerston 1995, Krutilla 1999). Hence horizontal and vertical linkages may simply
transaction costs for resouce management involve promote the individual institutions without
negotiations over shared values, objectives and promoting the flexibility or trust of the overall
consensus around sustainability, and involve social management structure or its adaptability.
interaction (as depicted in Fig. 3) well beyond
simple market exchange. It is not sufficient, of course, simply to observe that
many governance systems exhibit inequality in
Some transaction costs are related to interactions resources and hence the powerful usually get their
between regulators and resource users. In cases way. The reasons why inequality is important have
where these linkages involve contracts and been examined carefully by Boyce (1994), Baland
exchanges, transaction costs can be significant and and Platteau (1999), and others. Boyce (1994)
can limit the positive outcomes. Falconer (2000), demonstrates theoretically that in resource
for example, shows that farmers failed to adopt allocation decisions, the unequal power relationships
voluntary conservation practices in the UK even inherent in unequal distributions of wealth lead to
where they were being paid to do so because of the undesirable outcomes. If it is, in general, the
perceived high transaction costs in setting up the powerful who gain most from environmentally
contracts with government agencies. Policy damaging activities, then the bargained solution
mechanisms to avoid this mismatch in transactions between these winners and the less well-off losers
costs include reducing the costs to farmers (sufferers of the impacts of the environmentally
associated with voluntary schemes through farmers damaging activity) will be skewed towards the
negotiating collectively, or through governments benefits of the powerful. This occurs for a number
incurring the transaction costs themselves and of reasons including the additional transactions
futher compensating farmers for their time in costs of the bargaining on the less well-off group.
negotiations and providing information (Falconer
2000). If wealth and resources of the stakeholders are
correlated with their power and status at individual
It is well understood, therefore, how transaction and collective levels, then inequality in itself leads
costs limit action and constrain the exercise of to less co-operative linkages and less desirable
power (both domination and resistance). Costs outcomes for the linkages that actually emerge.
associated with initial search and building up of Power in decision-making is, of course, related to
networks (the links portrayed in Fig. 3) are fixed more than simply wealth or resources: it is
costs and act as an initial barrier to such interactions. circumscribed by cultural and other determinants of
Learning to engage policy makers through scientific governance (Scott 1998, Ribot and Peluso 2003).
and technical language or understanding the This explains why the powerful tend to get their
objectives of disparate organizations are, in effect, way, whatever the source of power.
transaction costs of cross-scale negotiations and
linkage. They become sunk costs when the The range of potential interactions outlined by
interactions are established and hence many cross- Young (2004), including coercive dominance and
scale linkages are effectively institutionalized. systemic change, highlights that the incentives and
Trust is vital to the continued existence of many potentially the benefits from the interactions are
linkages and trust is “costly”: it builds up through uneven. Dominance of an institution at one level
repeated interactions and institutionalization of the clearly leads to winners and losers. Institutions at
links. all levels, however, from resource users to
international organizations, utilize cross-scale
When the costs of setting up and maintaining cross- linkages to further their own interests and agendas
scale linkages are high, information and knowledge within their management systems whether they are
become highly asymmetric within the governance dominant or are simply resisting change. On the
system. The powerful have the important positive side, where there are material conflicts over
information because they can afford to invest in the distribution and allocation of resources, cross-
obtaining it. Conflicts associated with these scale linkages provide a platform for their
asymmetries can cause conflict and can eventually resolution.
undermine the governance structures (for differing
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In summary then, we have argued in this section that impacts outlined in the sections above.
cross-scale linkages are ubiquitous to resource
management institutions within social-ecological Identification of power relations between resource
systems. We have shown that the power relations users and the identification of cross-scale linkages
between the institutions effectively determine the that were a part of the governance system required
emergence and persistence of the cross-scale intensive interdisciplinary research. The research
interactions, whatever form they take. And these process undertaken by us from 1997 to 2001 became
power relations are universal: they are related to the integral to evolving management of the Park. Hence
application of knowledge and resources to further the researchers and actors from the government
particular interests and pervade all forms of social agencies involved became identifiable stakeholders
interaction. They have an economic dimension; the in the outcome of the management. The research
costs of setting up and maintaining linkages are used participatory methods including focus groups,
important. When power is unevenly distributed, ranking exercises, and consensus workshops. The
more powerful actors can tilt the playing field such initial interactions between stakeholders were based
that information and knowledge are further skewed on trust built up over two years. Thus the
in their favor. The implications of this political observations on power relations and cross-scale
economy approach to linkages are now illustrated linkages below are derived both from formally
with reference to a resource management system elicited perceptions of stakeholders themselves and
around a protected area in the Caribbean to from observations of the researchers acting as part
demonstrate the nature of winners and losers from of the management process.
interplay.
One of the identified constraints to co-management
in Trinidad and Tobago is that various levels of
A CASE STUDY OF GAINERS AND LOSERS government involved in management of coastal
FROM INTERPLAY resources are often conflicting in their aims and in
their attitudes to co-management and sharing
The foregoing discussion suggests that not all responsibility. Thus we further investigated pre-
interplay is equal in terms of its influence on action. requisites for sustainable and successful co-
The implications of cross-scale linkages in reality management at the scales involved in managing the
can best be deduced from cases of where such marine park within its multiple jurisdictions. Each
interactions occur. The issues raised are examined set of stakeholders recognized the constraints on
in this case with respect to co-management information and the tactics by which other groups
arrangements of a marine protected area in Tobago either facilitated or blocked their attempts to build
in the eastern Caribbean. The decline of coral reef, networks and cross-scale linkages. Across the
water quality, and fisheries resources over recent stakeholder groups we documented perceptions of
decades spurred the government of Trinidad and how these power relations played out. Table 1
Tobago in the 1990s to initiate a marine protected demonstrates, for example, that at both operational
area called the Buccoo Reef Marine Park. Efforts to and structural levels, stakeholders perceived
share responsibility and promote co-management problems both in developing cross-scale linkages
were initiated and partially supported through action (e.g., inadequate staff and resources, low levels of
research in the late 1990s. The research reported innovation) and in accessing information on how
here attempted to identify conflicts and trade-offs these linkages could be developed. These
between users of the Park and to seek consensus on perceptions in Table 1 reflect the underlying power
ways forward in co-management. Both government of actors at different levels.
and local user groups engaged in outreach activities
making linkages to both the research and In addition, the demand by most of the stakeholders
management processes and to other institutions at for cross-scale linkages to aid their co-management
various levels (as portrayed in Fig. 3). The research, of resources are subject to external constraints and
carried out over four years, involved investigation influences. While Trinidad and Tobago law outlines
of the techniques for identifying trade-offs and the rules governing national parks and protected
building consensus for co-management of the Park areas within the country, for example, the legal
(Brown et al. 2001, 2002). The observations in this framework is increasingly steered and constrained
paper are an analysis of the linkages and process of by international guidelines and initiatives on
management through the lens of power and its protecting biodiversity and various other
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Table 1. Perceptions of constraints to cross-scale linkages for participatory resource management among
regulators and resource users in Tobago, 1999-2001.
Organizational areas Perceived problems
Operational Inadequate staff trained in integrated and inclusive approaches.
Inadequate full-time outreach staff.
Few successful examples of integrated and inclusive approaches.
Over-use of external consultants.
Structural Information hoarding.
Inadequate public access to information.
Project-driven approaches impose project cycle and time-tabling.
Government workers slow to adapt methods used by external groups and communities.
Tompkins et al. 2002.
international agreements and aid donors. Indeed in linkages at the operational level, these linkages
Trinidad and Tobago participatory consultation for enabled access to resources and information beyond
the establishment of new protected areas has come the direct interaction.
about mainly through pressure from external
sources, such as the World Bank and mutli-lateral The sections above highlight the role of knowledge
donor agencies. These external stakeholders are in and information in the exercise of power. The
fact a major driver of environmental legislation research project itself represents a major source of
within the country. linkage for both civil society groups and
government agencies (examples 1, 2, and 4 in Table
There are a large number of cross-scale linkages 2). Access to information became a key aspect of
within the system of co-management of the local the power relations between stakeholders. For
resource of Buccoo Reef Marine Park, some of example, the blame for existing degradation of reef
which are summarized in Table 2. Table 2 also flats had for more than 20 years been attributed the
demonstrates the level which these linkages cross reef tour operators who take tourists to the reef. This
and attempts to show how the linkages between the was the highest profile and most visibly obvious
scales do not benefit all stakeholders equally. The reef degradation problem. Despite their previous
linkages include regular links to implement the marginalization, the reef tour operators group
organizations of co-management between the became involved in the co-management process.
regulators and the resource users (Linkage 1 in Previous scientific information collated as part of
Table 2); links from newly empowered user groups the research process showed that the long-term
to other best practices in the Caribbean (3) and to health of the reef was more dependent on reducing
the facilitators of the participatory processes (2); pollution loadings from coastal development than
and important links to sources of scientific on changes in tourism practices that had very
information that validated lay knowledge (4) of localized impacts (Pastorok and Bilyard 1985,
processes of degradation and renewal within the reef Rajkumar and Persad 1994, Kumarsingh et al.
system. The co-management efforts, although 1998). In this case, the cross-scale linkage
fragile, spurred the formation of local user groups empowered a previously disparate local users of the
of the Park. These groups engaged in dialogues with resource to engage in the co-management process
other reef user groups in the Caribbean region and altered the blame culture of the discourse.
(Geoghegan et al. 1999). Although such civil
society links ostensibly represent horizontal In the framework above the role of underlying
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Table 2. Differential benefits of cross-scale linkages in Buccoo Reef Marine Park.
Linkages Example Level of linkages Who benefits?
1. Forum for Buccoo Reef Advisory Group formed Resource users with government Regulators and user
participatory mana- between local resource users and consults regulators. groups equally.
gement with Marine Park authorities; implements
voluntary wardens and educational
activities.
2. Vertical linkages Resource stakeholders use consensus Both government agencies and User groups.
to enable building workshops to activate change and resource users linked with
participatory mana- access NGOs* and local media. ‘external’ researchers and media.
gement
3. Links to similar Buccoo Reef resource users make links to Horizontal linkages between User groups.
users elsewhere other co-management groups in St. Lucia resource users in different
and throughout the Caribbean. countries.
4. Links to Review of scientific evidence on causes of Both government agencies and Specific user groups.
scientific information coral reef decline validated the local resource users linked with Regulators.
perceptions of change and knowledge and ‘external’ researchers and
attributed change to a range of land-based scientific information
causes including sewage treatment and
land use change.
5. Access and Marine Park management influenced the Government stakeholders make Regulators.
influence over direction of national (Trinidad and vertical linkages within
external regulatory Tobago) legislation through government government structures
frameworks channels and linkages, excluding other
consultation.
* NGOs = non-governmental organizations
inequality in access to information is highlighted as also highlights examples of differential access to
a key element determining the nature of linkages. scientific information. Such linkages build the
In the Tobago case, regulatory stakeholders retained knowledge base and promote the interests of
a gatekeeper role to higher-level regulatory change individual stakeholders. How do these observations
throughout the negotiation and renegotiation of co- tie with the suggestions in the previous section on
management responsibilities. The fisheries and the role of power in cross-scale linkages? It appears
planning authorities had exclusive knowledge and that once engaged in a process of co-management
some influence over developments in legislation and rapidly evolving institutional structures,
and planning policy that were the remit of Trinidad opportunities for cross-scale interactions and
and Tobago national policy agencies. The local alliances abound. Government agencies tend to
stakeholders remained effectively outside of such have more resources to engage in such linkages and
processes. Hence cross-level linkages by these hence to benefit from them. Thus the initial
powerful agents began to undermine trust in shared distribution of linkages may indeed skew the power
management arrangements. The regulator always relations between groups. They also have the
appeared, in the perceptions of resource users, to potential to undermine trust between stakeholder
have a ‘trump card’ of access to central government groups. But the offsetting trend, that of
and higher level rule making bodies. empowerment of previously disengaged stakeholder
groups, is also apparent in this case. Thus the
There are many examples, in the case of Buccoo political economy of cross-scale linkages requires
Reef Marine Park, of cross-scale linkages between systematic empirical evaluation, recognizing the
resource users and external agents and between role of power in all its manifestations within
different levels of regulatory institutions. Table 2 processes of negotiation.
Ecology and Society 10(2): 9
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Responses to this article can be read online at:
CONCLUSIONS
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol10/iss2/art9/responses/
In this analysis we have examined the structure of
interplay as a major shaping force in cross-scale
interactions. The cross-scale nature of resource
Acknowledgments:
management systems is under-researched. Many, if
not all systems, are inherently cross-scale and their
We thank the UK Department for International
success in promoting sustained engagement and
Development, the ESRC Programme on Environmental
resilient and shared management are determined by
Decision-making in CSERGE, and the Leverhulme
factors at a range of levels from constitutional and
Trust for research support. This article is based on
organizational to those at the level of resource users.
research supported (in part) by a grant from the U.
The example above, of the linkages that helped to
S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's
shape a co-management arrangement for marine
Office of Global Programs for the Knowledge
park management in Tobago, demonstrates that
Systems for Sustainable Development Project based
there are many of the types of linkages identified by
at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. We
Young (2005) and Cash et al. (2005) that exist
also thank the Resilience Alliance and the Initiative
simultaneously and evolve over time.
for Science and Technology for Sustainability for
organising the meeting on Scale and Cross-scale
The theoretical analysis in the sections above
Dynamics in Montreal, October 2003. We thank all
suggests that the structure of interplay in cross-scale
the participants for stimulating discussion, David
linkages is intertwined with the political economy
Cash for insights and encouragement, and two
of those linkages. There are winners and losers in
referees for helpful reviews. This version remains
cross-scale dynamics, though interactions, the
our own responsibility.
linkages are by no means a zero-sum game. In
addition, some linkages emerge that radically alter
the playing field while others reinforce existing
inequalities between powerful and less powerful
players. These observations all attest to the role of
power in determining the structure of multi-scale
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Insight, part of a Special Feature on Scale and Cross-scale Dynamics
The Political Economy of Cross-Scale Networks in Resource Co-
Management
W. Neil Adger1, Katrina Brown2, and Emma L. Tompkins2
ABSTRACT. We investigate linkages between stakeholders in resource management that occur at different
spatial and institutional levels and identify the winners and losers in such interactions. So-called cross-
scale interactions emerge because of the benefits to individual stakeholder groups in undertaking them or
the high costs of not undertaking them. Hence there are uneven gains from cross-scale interactions that are
themselves an integral part of social-ecological system governance. The political economy framework
outlined here suggests that the determinants of the emergence of cross-scale interactions are the exercise
of relative power between stakeholders and their costs of accessing and creating linkages. Cross-scale
interactions by powerful stakeholders have the potential to undermine trust in resource management
arrangements. If government regulators, for example, mobilize information and resources from cross-level
interactions to reinforce their authority, this often disempowers other stakeholders such as resource users.
Offsetting such impacts, some cross-scale interactions can be empowering for local level user groups in
creating social and political capital. These issues are illustrated with observations on resource management
in a marine protected area in Tobago in the Caribbean. The case study demonstrates that the structure of
the cross-scale interplay, in terms of relative winners and losers, determines its contribution to the resilience
of social-ecological systems.
Key Words: Caribbean; institutions; marine protected areas; natural resource management; power; social-
ecological resilience; transaction costs.
2002). Yet we argue in this paper that it is important
INTRODUCTION to recognize the winners and losers from cross-scale
interactions on the basis of the exercise of power
We address here the political economy of the through domination, resistance, and co-operation.
evolution of cross scale linkages. We suggest that
cross-scale linkages evolve and are maintained by An understanding of cross-scale linkages is
the organizations and institutions involved in important in managing multiple use resources. By
resource management to further their own interests. linkages we mean direct interactions through
Rational choice analysis has always suggested that networks to provide information or tangible
collective action between directly interested parties resources related to the management system. Of
in any decision, given the power relations between course almost all possible natural resources systems
them, does not come about without perceived gain involve multiple direct users. Even when direct
through the bargain. By the same logic, cross-scale users of resources are small in number or strictly
interactions come about only because it is in the limited, there are inevitably multiple external
interest of one or other of the stakeholders involved stakeholders making claims and calls on natural
to develop and to maintain these linkages. Such an resources at numerous scales. Cross-scale
account does not, however, explain all social institutional linkages are the norm and even
interaction between stakeholders in resource
management. Nor can self-interest predict the shape
of interactions in every context (Richerson et al.
1
Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, 2University of East Anglia
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universal in natural resource management (Berkes at the same time, offsetting linkages facilitate the
2002). empowerment of local user groups.
Part of this trend towards multiple competing claims
stems from processes of integration of localities, A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LINKAGES
societies, and economies in multi-level governance
and economic systems. In a globalized world,
environmental services and functions are The structure of interplay in resource co-
increasingly seen as public goods. They have management
multiple beneficiaries and claims to them at national
and global levels. Many ecosystem services, such The overview paper to this special issue explores
as carbon sequestration functions, the maintenance how cross-scale and cross-level dynamics can take
of the world's stock of genetic biological resources, different forms (Cash et al. 2005). From the realm
and shared water resources are all portrayed as of international agreements through to local level
public goods with a value to global society (Dietz governance of institutions, there are particular
et al. 2003). Inevitably then, markets are created to patterns of interaction. These interactions between
generate incentives for conserving the atmosphere, stakeholders are widely observed (Berkes 2002),
water, habitats, or species, for the benefit of but they are also widely promoted as solutions to
stakeholders remote from the resources. Direct sustainability of community-based management
resource users are drawn into market exchanges (Brown 2003, Berkes 2004). They are promoted
where previously their relationship to resources may because shared responsibility for management of
have been based on stewardship, self-interest, or resources creates positive incentives for sustainable
other forms of value (O'Neill 2001). Hence the use and overcomes problems of legitimacy from
scope for cross-scale linkages has multiplied with traditional resource management.
the increasing interdependence and global linkages
in the world economy. In some cases, the imposition of “traditional”
resource management (Fig. 1) by government
In effect we question whether integrated and well- agencies who define social and environmental goals
linked resource systems (nested within national and for resource management could be judged as “top
international agendas, regimes, networks, and legal down” management. In such cases, a regulatory
systems) are a priori more robust or resilient than framework is imposed on resource users, with the
those with greater autonomy and less linkages. “imposers” often impervious to feedback or
Anderies and colleagues (2004) argue that failure learning from resource users and civil society.
of the links between resources, governance systems, Figure 1 shows linkages between individual agents
and their associated infrastructures reduce the in the communities. Such local level linkages for
robustness of a social-ecological system. In this resource management are independent of the
paper, we address in particular the links between regulatory framework and indeed networks often
elements of the governance of social-ecological develop to substitute for de iure regulations or act
systems: these are the links between resource users to circumvent them (Pretty and Ward 2001, Pretty
on the one hand, and regulators and government 2004).
agencies on the other (Anderies et al. 2004). We
argue that part of the persistence and stability of the One of the main problems identified with the top-
governance system depends on the distribution of down model of interaction between government
benefits from cross-scale linkages, demonstrated by agencies and resource users in Figure 1 is that these
the ability of the system to command legitimacy and so-called “traditional” resource management
trust among the resource user and the governmental practices lead to locked-in patterns of resource use.
stakeholders. If the structure of cross-scale linkages These patterns are often detrimental to the ability to
reduces trust then the robustness of the system is in adapt to surprise and shock: management based
question. In empirical research, we examine the solely on the stability of systems creates its own
structure of interplay of cross-scale linkages in the pathologies of risk (Holling and Meffe 1996).
context of a marine protected area in Tobago in the Carpenter et al. (2001) propose that rather than
eastern Caribbean. We argue that the benefits from seeking adaptation decisions that maximize
emerging and dynamic linkages are frequently efficient use of resources at one time scale, a more
uneven, often reinforcing existing inequalities. But, desirable normative goal should be the enhancement
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Fig. 1. A representation of traditional resource management interactions between government and resource
users.
of resilience of social-ecological resource systems management is de rigeur and promoted throughout
to allow for flexibility and perseverance of a system the world through decentralization of control from
in a state that provides resources and services to government agencies to institutions and committees
users. of so-called co-management of resources. There are
a number of benefits to the co-management of
The system of resource management portrayed in resources, defined here as shared responsibility
Figure 1 is a stylized representation that is, it between institutions of the state and of local
appears, at odds with much rhetoric on conservation resource users. Co-management can lead to reduced
practice throughout the world. Community-based enforcement costs, the sharing of knowledge and
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Figure 2. Interactions between government and civil society in co-management arrangements.
Brown et al. 2002.
information on the resource, and systematic users and markets. With appropriate governance
learning between all parties. This situation is structure for sharing rights and responsibilities for
portrayed in Figure 2, contrasting with ‘traditional’ management, there are more direct linkages
resource management depicted in Figure 1, with the between agents of government and resource users,
two main protagonists being institutions of the state while information and learning processes flow
(top) and the community (bottom). Under co- between them (Fig. 2).
management, the resource users retain their internal
linkages and horizontal linkages to other resource
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Co-management of resources is not a panacea for to overcome inertia and trigger change (Cash et al.
robustness. There are particular areas of resource 2005). Some of the determinants of cross-scale
conservation where participatory management is, in interaction are better understood than others. The
effect, a new received wisdom. Yet the devolution nature of the resources being managed clearly
of responsibility often comes without devolution of affects, to some degree, the institutional design. The
rights (Adams et al. 2003, Brown 2003). In the size of the resources, the physical pressure on
developing world in particular, the popularity of exploitation, the cost of enforcement, and the static
community-based management may have arisen or fugitive nature of resources all play a part in
because of the reduction of resources and determining the governance structures of collective
effectiveness of the state and its inability to mobilize resources (Dolšak and Ostrom 2003). These same
resources to provide public infrastructure. But the factors are likely to be important in determining the
resources are similarly not available for the new cross-scale interactions that form part of the
institutions of co-management (Ribot 2002). In such institutions of governance, and have been proposed
circumstances, cross-scale interactions that develop by Anderies et al. (2004) as important design
do so as a substitute rather than as a complement to elements for robust social-ecological systems.
good governance (Cooke and Kothari 2001).
Figure 3 portrays the range of cross-scale
There have been a number of reviews of experience interactions that are commonly observed in co-
of co-management (Berkes et al. 2001, Brown et al. management arrangements in addition to the
2002) and attempts to explain “best practice” within linkages between state and local community (as
resource co-management (Berkes 2004). These portrayed in Figure 2). Local level resource users
have focused on the legitimacy of the interactions make common cause with communities in the same
between resource users and government agencies situation to learn lessons and spread best practice,
and on the incorporation of local and scientific as well as to act cooperatively in bargaining with
knowledge into management. Olsson et al. (2004) government. These are portrayed as horizontal
and Tompkins et al. (2002) have hypothesized pre- linkages between resource users, other civil society
requisites for sustained interaction between groups and scientific organizations, media and
stakeholders in co-management that include: (1) advocacy organizations both within and external to
enabling constitutional order and legislation, (2) the the locality and jurisdiction of the resources (Fig.
ability for organizations to monitor and adapt their 3). Similarly, government agencies involved in
co-management experiments, and (3) the presence resource management frequently have horizontal
of leaders and agents for change. linkages to cognate departments and organizations.
Vertical external linkages portrayed in Figure 3
Design principles for cross-scale interaction are include those by both communities and agencies to
only part of the story. Berkes (2002) argues that government and regulatory agencies at other levels.
virtually all resource management systems have
some external linkages and drivers at different
scales. He argues that a failure to recognize these Power relations determine the nature of
linkages is a central reason for some unsuccessful interaction
interventions in resource systems and that the
persistence of resource degradation may be in part The arrows in Figure 3 show the existence of cross-
related to ‘cross-scale institutional pathologies’: “it scale interactions. But these cross-scale interactions
is useful to start with the assumption that a given can take different forms. Young (2002, 2005)
resource management system is multi-scale and that classifies the interactions between institutions at
it should be managed at different scales different levels (i.e., vertical interplay) as being in
simultaneously” (Berkes 2002:317). the form of dominance, separation, merger,
negotiated outcome, or systemic change by both
The linkages between resource stakeholders at parties. We hypothesize that the form of these
different scales are then determined by the structure interactions is determined by both the power
of the vertical and horizontal interplay between relations inherent within them and the transactions
actors; the characteristics of the resource being costs associated with them.
managed; aspects of agency such as the emergence
of leadership and the translation of knowledge at First, power and the exercise of power determine
different levels; and the social construction of crisis how cross-scale interactions occur. The analysis of
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Figure 3. Cross scale linkages in resource management.
Co-management institutions instigate linkages to other regulators and users. They also promote vertical
linkages to access knowledge, resources, and other forms of legitimacy.
power is widespread and contested within the social aspects of power relating to tactical exercises of
sciences. But at its core there is an understanding of power through mechanisms of social interaction
power as the application of action, knowledge, and and, on the other hand, structural implications of
resources to resolve problems and further interests power that are manifested through the distribution
(Lukes 1974, Few 2002). Few (2002) makes a key of resources and influence. Thus power may be
distinction between, on the one hand, sociological exercised through different mechanisms at different
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temporal and spatial scales. Peterson (2000) has
argued for a simple hierarchy: the exercise of power The negative implications of cross-scale linkages
at local levels is overt and power at higher temporal on the less powerful can, however, be offset by other
and spatial scales is always covert or structural types of linkage. Some forms of both vertical and
(Lukes 1974). This does not seem to be supportable. horizontal interaction promote and facilitate so-
Clearly different manifestations of power are not called “political capital” (Birner and Wittmer 2003).
scale dependent in time or space because power is Community interactions in co-management and in
in the very fabric of social systems and resides in vertical interplay with other institutions have been
every perception, judgement, and act, no matter shown in particular circumstances to side benefits
what the context (Foucault 1986, Few 2002). Power of politicizing and empowering the local level
is embedded in the ideas and discourses that frame institutions. Hence the vertical interplay, depending
the resource management problem in hand and on its structure, can change the nature of the bargain
operates largely independent of scale (Pritchard and and power relations between stakeholders. Birner
Sanderson 2002). and Wittmer (2003) argue that the high level of
political mobilization of the rural population of
Hence the important elements of power in Thailand who were involved in community forestry
determining the interactions between actors across practices was so significant that it helped to
scales are how decisions are negotiated, how trade- strengthen the nation's democratic institutions at
offs are made to give room for manoeuvre, and how crucial periods over the past decades [see Sneddon
other actors are enrolled on a cause (Arce and Long (2003), however, on the contested definitions of
1992). Knowledge is a key resource in the exercises political power in this context]. Birner and Wittmer
of power: it is used by both dominant parties and by (2003) show that social capital built through shared
those resisting action. Actors across social and resource management can give impetus to political
temporal scales use these same mechanisms in the action through a number of mechanisms.
exercise of power.
Social interaction in resource management provide
The issues of power within cross-scale interactions platforms for political participation, foster political
are illustrated in the case of political linkages by ideas, as well as more fundamental issues of
rubber tappers in Amazonia. Brown and Rosendo building skills for public debate and knowledge of
(2000) outline the strategies of community-based political processes. These potential gains from
organizations of small scale rubber tappers in vertical interplay for the less powerful stakeholder
Rondonia in Brazil in promoting their interest groups are a counterpoint to the coercive dominance
through bypassing local governance structures. of some forms of linkage. The institutions of co-
They show that the rubber tappers successfully management, in effect, exhibit cross-scale linkages
recruited the resources of international organizations, that can potentially subvert assumed power
including the World Bank in “levelling the playing hierarchies from top to bottom in institutional scale.
field” with state and federal government agencies.
The linkages they adopted (vertical linkages in Fig. The second element in the political economy of how
3) allowed them to deploy both information and cross-scale interactions occur is the cost of
resources to renegotiate their sphere of influence in knowledge. The cost of obtaining knowledge is a
resource management and to secure their key element itself in the calculus of power. In
livelihoods. But such international alliances are institutional economics, these costs are known as
potentially fragile. In this case, they posed political transaction costs and are made of up the costs
risks for the grassroots organizations in their associated with searching for information,
dealings with government (Conklin and Graham searching for partners in collective action, drawing
1995). Government agencies, usually dominant in up and enforcing contracts, and building up
their relationship with the rubber tappers' networks and social capital. In neo-classical
organizations, lost trust in the existing institutions economics, transactions costs relate primarily to the
of governance, excluded the local resource users, costs of exchange and search within markets.
and set up their own cross-scale interactions to re- Hence, neo-classical economics portrays such costs
establish their dominance. Thus cross-scale as a drag on efficiency. But there are broader
interactions are always negotiated outcomes of transaction costs in social interactions around
power relations, reaffirming the hierarchies of environmental and resource management. The
institutions and actors. desired outcomes of environmental management
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such as the maintenance of ecosystem services and views see Baland and Platteau 1999, Agrawal 2001,
resilience are more often public rather than private Adams et al. 2003). Hence we argue that particular
goods (Eggerston 1995, Krutilla 1999). Hence horizontal and vertical linkages may simply
transaction costs for resouce management involve promote the individual institutions without
negotiations over shared values, objectives and promoting the flexibility or trust of the overall
consensus around sustainability, and involve social management structure or its adaptability.
interaction (as depicted in Fig. 3) well beyond
simple market exchange. It is not sufficient, of course, simply to observe that
many governance systems exhibit inequality in
Some transaction costs are related to interactions resources and hence the powerful usually get their
between regulators and resource users. In cases way. The reasons why inequality is important have
where these linkages involve contracts and been examined carefully by Boyce (1994), Baland
exchanges, transaction costs can be significant and and Platteau (1999), and others. Boyce (1994)
can limit the positive outcomes. Falconer (2000), demonstrates theoretically that in resource
for example, shows that farmers failed to adopt allocation decisions, the unequal power relationships
voluntary conservation practices in the UK even inherent in unequal distributions of wealth lead to
where they were being paid to do so because of the undesirable outcomes. If it is, in general, the
perceived high transaction costs in setting up the powerful who gain most from environmentally
contracts with government agencies. Policy damaging activities, then the bargained solution
mechanisms to avoid this mismatch in transactions between these winners and the less well-off losers
costs include reducing the costs to farmers (sufferers of the impacts of the environmentally
associated with voluntary schemes through farmers damaging activity) will be skewed towards the
negotiating collectively, or through governments benefits of the powerful. This occurs for a number
incurring the transaction costs themselves and of reasons including the additional transactions
futher compensating farmers for their time in costs of the bargaining on the less well-off group.
negotiations and providing information (Falconer
2000). If wealth and resources of the stakeholders are
correlated with their power and status at individual
It is well understood, therefore, how transaction and collective levels, then inequality in itself leads
costs limit action and constrain the exercise of to less co-operative linkages and less desirable
power (both domination and resistance). Costs outcomes for the linkages that actually emerge.
associated with initial search and building up of Power in decision-making is, of course, related to
networks (the links portrayed in Fig. 3) are fixed more than simply wealth or resources: it is
costs and act as an initial barrier to such interactions. circumscribed by cultural and other determinants of
Learning to engage policy makers through scientific governance (Scott 1998, Ribot and Peluso 2003).
and technical language or understanding the This explains why the powerful tend to get their
objectives of disparate organizations are, in effect, way, whatever the source of power.
transaction costs of cross-scale negotiations and
linkage. They become sunk costs when the The range of potential interactions outlined by
interactions are established and hence many cross- Young (2004), including coercive dominance and
scale linkages are effectively institutionalized. systemic change, highlights that the incentives and
Trust is vital to the continued existence of many potentially the benefits from the interactions are
linkages and trust is “costly”: it builds up through uneven. Dominance of an institution at one level
repeated interactions and institutionalization of the clearly leads to winners and losers. Institutions at
links. all levels, however, from resource users to
international organizations, utilize cross-scale
When the costs of setting up and maintaining cross- linkages to further their own interests and agendas
scale linkages are high, information and knowledge within their management systems whether they are
become highly asymmetric within the governance dominant or are simply resisting change. On the
system. The powerful have the important positive side, where there are material conflicts over
information because they can afford to invest in the distribution and allocation of resources, cross-
obtaining it. Conflicts associated with these scale linkages provide a platform for their
asymmetries can cause conflict and can eventually resolution.
undermine the governance structures (for differing
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In summary then, we have argued in this section that impacts outlined in the sections above.
cross-scale linkages are ubiquitous to resource
management institutions within social-ecological Identification of power relations between resource
systems. We have shown that the power relations users and the identification of cross-scale linkages
between the institutions effectively determine the that were a part of the governance system required
emergence and persistence of the cross-scale intensive interdisciplinary research. The research
interactions, whatever form they take. And these process undertaken by us from 1997 to 2001 became
power relations are universal: they are related to the integral to evolving management of the Park. Hence
application of knowledge and resources to further the researchers and actors from the government
particular interests and pervade all forms of social agencies involved became identifiable stakeholders
interaction. They have an economic dimension; the in the outcome of the management. The research
costs of setting up and maintaining linkages are used participatory methods including focus groups,
important. When power is unevenly distributed, ranking exercises, and consensus workshops. The
more powerful actors can tilt the playing field such initial interactions between stakeholders were based
that information and knowledge are further skewed on trust built up over two years. Thus the
in their favor. The implications of this political observations on power relations and cross-scale
economy approach to linkages are now illustrated linkages below are derived both from formally
with reference to a resource management system elicited perceptions of stakeholders themselves and
around a protected area in the Caribbean to from observations of the researchers acting as part
demonstrate the nature of winners and losers from of the management process.
interplay.
One of the identified constraints to co-management
in Trinidad and Tobago is that various levels of
A CASE STUDY OF GAINERS AND LOSERS government involved in management of coastal
FROM INTERPLAY resources are often conflicting in their aims and in
their attitudes to co-management and sharing
The foregoing discussion suggests that not all responsibility. Thus we further investigated pre-
interplay is equal in terms of its influence on action. requisites for sustainable and successful co-
The implications of cross-scale linkages in reality management at the scales involved in managing the
can best be deduced from cases of where such marine park within its multiple jurisdictions. Each
interactions occur. The issues raised are examined set of stakeholders recognized the constraints on
in this case with respect to co-management information and the tactics by which other groups
arrangements of a marine protected area in Tobago either facilitated or blocked their attempts to build
in the eastern Caribbean. The decline of coral reef, networks and cross-scale linkages. Across the
water quality, and fisheries resources over recent stakeholder groups we documented perceptions of
decades spurred the government of Trinidad and how these power relations played out. Table 1
Tobago in the 1990s to initiate a marine protected demonstrates, for example, that at both operational
area called the Buccoo Reef Marine Park. Efforts to and structural levels, stakeholders perceived
share responsibility and promote co-management problems both in developing cross-scale linkages
were initiated and partially supported through action (e.g., inadequate staff and resources, low levels of
research in the late 1990s. The research reported innovation) and in accessing information on how
here attempted to identify conflicts and trade-offs these linkages could be developed. These
between users of the Park and to seek consensus on perceptions in Table 1 reflect the underlying power
ways forward in co-management. Both government of actors at different levels.
and local user groups engaged in outreach activities
making linkages to both the research and In addition, the demand by most of the stakeholders
management processes and to other institutions at for cross-scale linkages to aid their co-management
various levels (as portrayed in Fig. 3). The research, of resources are subject to external constraints and
carried out over four years, involved investigation influences. While Trinidad and Tobago law outlines
of the techniques for identifying trade-offs and the rules governing national parks and protected
building consensus for co-management of the Park areas within the country, for example, the legal
(Brown et al. 2001, 2002). The observations in this framework is increasingly steered and constrained
paper are an analysis of the linkages and process of by international guidelines and initiatives on
management through the lens of power and its protecting biodiversity and various other
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Table 1. Perceptions of constraints to cross-scale linkages for participatory resource management among
regulators and resource users in Tobago, 1999-2001.
Organizational areas Perceived problems
Operational Inadequate staff trained in integrated and inclusive approaches.
Inadequate full-time outreach staff.
Few successful examples of integrated and inclusive approaches.
Over-use of external consultants.
Structural Information hoarding.
Inadequate public access to information.
Project-driven approaches impose project cycle and time-tabling.
Government workers slow to adapt methods used by external groups and communities.
Tompkins et al. 2002.
international agreements and aid donors. Indeed in linkages at the operational level, these linkages
Trinidad and Tobago participatory consultation for enabled access to resources and information beyond
the establishment of new protected areas has come the direct interaction.
about mainly through pressure from external
sources, such as the World Bank and mutli-lateral The sections above highlight the role of knowledge
donor agencies. These external stakeholders are in and information in the exercise of power. The
fact a major driver of environmental legislation research project itself represents a major source of
within the country. linkage for both civil society groups and
government agencies (examples 1, 2, and 4 in Table
There are a large number of cross-scale linkages 2). Access to information became a key aspect of
within the system of co-management of the local the power relations between stakeholders. For
resource of Buccoo Reef Marine Park, some of example, the blame for existing degradation of reef
which are summarized in Table 2. Table 2 also flats had for more than 20 years been attributed the
demonstrates the level which these linkages cross reef tour operators who take tourists to the reef. This
and attempts to show how the linkages between the was the highest profile and most visibly obvious
scales do not benefit all stakeholders equally. The reef degradation problem. Despite their previous
linkages include regular links to implement the marginalization, the reef tour operators group
organizations of co-management between the became involved in the co-management process.
regulators and the resource users (Linkage 1 in Previous scientific information collated as part of
Table 2); links from newly empowered user groups the research process showed that the long-term
to other best practices in the Caribbean (3) and to health of the reef was more dependent on reducing
the facilitators of the participatory processes (2); pollution loadings from coastal development than
and important links to sources of scientific on changes in tourism practices that had very
information that validated lay knowledge (4) of localized impacts (Pastorok and Bilyard 1985,
processes of degradation and renewal within the reef Rajkumar and Persad 1994, Kumarsingh et al.
system. The co-management efforts, although 1998). In this case, the cross-scale linkage
fragile, spurred the formation of local user groups empowered a previously disparate local users of the
of the Park. These groups engaged in dialogues with resource to engage in the co-management process
other reef user groups in the Caribbean region and altered the blame culture of the discourse.
(Geoghegan et al. 1999). Although such civil
society links ostensibly represent horizontal In the framework above the role of underlying
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Table 2. Differential benefits of cross-scale linkages in Buccoo Reef Marine Park.
Linkages Example Level of linkages Who benefits?
1. Forum for Buccoo Reef Advisory Group formed Resource users with government Regulators and user
participatory mana- between local resource users and consults regulators. groups equally.
gement with Marine Park authorities; implements
voluntary wardens and educational
activities.
2. Vertical linkages Resource stakeholders use consensus Both government agencies and User groups.
to enable building workshops to activate change and resource users linked with
participatory mana- access NGOs* and local media. ‘external’ researchers and media.
gement
3. Links to similar Buccoo Reef resource users make links to Horizontal linkages between User groups.
users elsewhere other co-management groups in St. Lucia resource users in different
and throughout the Caribbean. countries.
4. Links to Review of scientific evidence on causes of Both government agencies and Specific user groups.
scientific information coral reef decline validated the local resource users linked with Regulators.
perceptions of change and knowledge and ‘external’ researchers and
attributed change to a range of land-based scientific information
causes including sewage treatment and
land use change.
5. Access and Marine Park management influenced the Government stakeholders make Regulators.
influence over direction of national (Trinidad and vertical linkages within
external regulatory Tobago) legislation through government government structures
frameworks channels and linkages, excluding other
consultation.
* NGOs = non-governmental organizations
inequality in access to information is highlighted as also highlights examples of differential access to
a key element determining the nature of linkages. scientific information. Such linkages build the
In the Tobago case, regulatory stakeholders retained knowledge base and promote the interests of
a gatekeeper role to higher-level regulatory change individual stakeholders. How do these observations
throughout the negotiation and renegotiation of co- tie with the suggestions in the previous section on
management responsibilities. The fisheries and the role of power in cross-scale linkages? It appears
planning authorities had exclusive knowledge and that once engaged in a process of co-management
some influence over developments in legislation and rapidly evolving institutional structures,
and planning policy that were the remit of Trinidad opportunities for cross-scale interactions and
and Tobago national policy agencies. The local alliances abound. Government agencies tend to
stakeholders remained effectively outside of such have more resources to engage in such linkages and
processes. Hence cross-level linkages by these hence to benefit from them. Thus the initial
powerful agents began to undermine trust in shared distribution of linkages may indeed skew the power
management arrangements. The regulator always relations between groups. They also have the
appeared, in the perceptions of resource users, to potential to undermine trust between stakeholder
have a ‘trump card’ of access to central government groups. But the offsetting trend, that of
and higher level rule making bodies. empowerment of previously disengaged stakeholder
groups, is also apparent in this case. Thus the
There are many examples, in the case of Buccoo political economy of cross-scale linkages requires
Reef Marine Park, of cross-scale linkages between systematic empirical evaluation, recognizing the
resource users and external agents and between role of power in all its manifestations within
different levels of regulatory institutions. Table 2 processes of negotiation.
Ecology and Society 10(2): 9
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Responses to this article can be read online at:
CONCLUSIONS
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol10/iss2/art9/responses/
In this analysis we have examined the structure of
interplay as a major shaping force in cross-scale
interactions. The cross-scale nature of resource
Acknowledgments:
management systems is under-researched. Many, if
not all systems, are inherently cross-scale and their
We thank the UK Department for International
success in promoting sustained engagement and
Development, the ESRC Programme on Environmental
resilient and shared management are determined by
Decision-making in CSERGE, and the Leverhulme
factors at a range of levels from constitutional and
Trust for research support. This article is based on
organizational to those at the level of resource users.
research supported (in part) by a grant from the U.
The example above, of the linkages that helped to
S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's
shape a co-management arrangement for marine
Office of Global Programs for the Knowledge
park management in Tobago, demonstrates that
Systems for Sustainable Development Project based
there are many of the types of linkages identified by
at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. We
Young (2005) and Cash et al. (2005) that exist
also thank the Resilience Alliance and the Initiative
simultaneously and evolve over time.
for Science and Technology for Sustainability for
organising the meeting on Scale and Cross-scale
The theoretical analysis in the sections above
Dynamics in Montreal, October 2003. We thank all
suggests that the structure of interplay in cross-scale
the participants for stimulating discussion, David
linkages is intertwined with the political economy
Cash for insights and encouragement, and two
of those linkages. There are winners and losers in
referees for helpful reviews. This version remains
cross-scale dynamics, though interactions, the
our own responsibility.
linkages are by no means a zero-sum game. In
addition, some linkages emerge that radically alter
the playing field while others reinforce existing
inequalities between powerful and less powerful
players. These observations all attest to the role of
power in determining the structure of multi-scale
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